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Abstract
Japan economy has experienced the low interest rate environment since
1999. As the authority of monetary policy in Japan, Bank of Japan (BoJ) has
implemented several unconventional monetary policy programs to stimu-
late the real economy since 1999 when the zero lower bound (ZLB) of pol-
icy rate became binding and the policy rate lost its function as a policy in-
strument. Compared with the central banks in other developed economies
such as Fed Reserve Board (FRB) or Bank of England (BoE) that started
unconventional monetary policy due to the Great Recession from 2007 to
2013 incurred by the 2007-2008 global financial crisis, Bank of Japan has
more than 15 years’ experience on the implementation of unconventional
monetary policy. As the global economy is still in slow recovery and the
low interest rate environment still prevails in major developed economies,
in the foreseeable future for some time, the unconventional monetary pol-
icy will be the main policy regime of the central banks, also be the ma-
jor concern of macroeconomics, it is necessary to give some temporary
summary of the unconventional monetary policy conducted by Bank of
Japan. In this doctoral thesis, unconventional monetary policy in Japan
is my main research topic and this topic will be discussed from both em-
pirical and theoretical views. This research will provide some tentative
conclusions for the questions such as how we evaluate the policy stance of
Bank of Japan, or what the macroeconomic performance would have be if
the unconventional monetary policy hadn’t been implemented. The main
methodology of the research is to estimate the shadow rate from a shadow
rate term structure model, and then use the shadow rate as a proxy vari-
able of unconventional monetary policy in some non-structural or struc-
tural econometric procedures, including Vector Autoregression (VAR) or
Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models, to check the pol-
icy effect empirically. Also, we model the main transmission mechanism
of unconventional monetary policy, portfolio rebalance mechanism, in a
theoretical-consistent way to provide some theory-based insights.
This research will not be the end of the exploration of the unconven-
tional monetary policy, but a comprehensive summary as a reference for
the future study. The brief summary of each chapter is given as follows.
Chapter 1: This chapter is the introduction of this doctoral thesis. Firstly,
I give a brief introduction of unconventional monetary policy including the
ii
theoretical background and empirical evidence. Our understanding of the
unconventional monetary policy is still very limited, but there exists some
theoretical consensus about why and how liquidity trap happens, what
central banks can do to stimulate the economy facing the zero lower bound
constraint. The theoretical background of unconventional monetary policy
is explained in a unified fashion, a standard small-scale New Keynesian
DSGE model with some numerical examples. Then we do some literature
review about the empirical evidence about the unconventional monetary
policy. While we introduce the theatrical and empirical issues about the
unconventional monetary policy, we also review the history of the policy
programs of Bank of Japan, so we can understand what Bank of Japan has
done since 1999 in a theoretical and empirical context.
Chapter 2: In this chapter, we use a shadow rate term structure model
and yield curve data of Japan government bond to estimate the shadow
short interest rate, or more simply, shadow rate. Shadow rate is same as
the short-term policy rate in the normal non-ZLB environment but can
take negative value in the ZLB environment. The estimated shadow rate
is explained in detail by an event study fashion in the time line context
of the policy programs conducted by Bank of Japan since 1999. By check
the policy decisions officially declared by the Bank of Japan, we can find
the shadow rate is a good approximation to describe the policy stance of
monetary authority. The main conclusion is that by monitoring the esti-
mated shadow rate, we can obtain a consistent and comparable insight of
the different policy programs. This chapter provides the foundation of the
whole research that the shadow rate is a reasonable and consistent measure
of monetary policy in both non-ZLB and ZLB environment and we can use
the shadow rate for the analysis of unconventional monetary policy.
Chapter 3: We use the estimated shadow rate in Chapter 2 to conduct
some econometric exercises. We run two kinds of time series econometric
procedures, Time Varying Parameter-Stochastic Volatility Vector Autore-
gression (TVP-SV VAR) model and standard New Keynesian DSGE model
to check the empirical relationship of shadow rate and macroeconomic
variables. The empirical results show that the shadow rate can be used
in both structural model and non-structural model. The estimation results
of structural parameters and impulse response are also very robust for the
monetary policy analysis.
Chapter 4: Following the analysis in Chapter 3, we build a medium-
scale DSGEmodel and estimate it with the shadow rate for Japan economy.
For a long time, how to deal with the ZLB in the estimation of DSGE mod-
els has been a major difficulty in macroeconomic research. Standard proce-
dures for DSGE modeling such as local linear approximation and Kalman
filter can’t handle the nonlinearity incurred by the ZLB and the nonlinear
methods such as global approximation and particle filter are highly compli-
cated and computation-demanding. In this chapter, we show that with the
iii
shadow rate, we can still get reasonable estimation results and policy im-
plications implied by the model dynamics. The merit that we use a DSGE
model is that we can conduct a counterfactual simulation to find what the
macroeconomic performance would have be if the unconventional mon-
etary policy hadn’t been implemented. The simulation shows that with-
out the unconventional monetary policy since 1999, Japan economy would
have had bad performance compared with its actual realization.
Chapter 5: This chapter is relatively independent from other chapters.
In other chapters, we use the shadow rate as a comprehensive measure of
the unconventional monetary policy without considering the specific trans-
mission mechanism. In this chapter, we map the portfolio rebalance mech-
anism of quantitative easing (QE) in a medium-scale DSGE model. The
model is calibrated to fit the balance sheet of Bank of Japan and the struc-
ture of Japan government bond. Through some policy experiments, we
find the different policy effects caused by different scenarios of quantitative
easing. These policy experiments provide some insights about the future
policy direction of quantitative easing.
Chapter 6: The review of thewhole research, aboutwhatwe have known
through this doctoral thesis and what we should do in the next step, will
be summarized in Chapter 6. The main originality in this doctor thesis is
to use the shadow rate as a clue to review the full history of the uncon-
ventional monetary policy programs conducted by Bank of Japan, which
makes the whole research consistent and tractable.
Appendix: Model derivation, mathematical proof, some figures and ta-
bles and other related technical details are provided in Appendix for refer-
ence. All results in this doctoral thesis can be replicated. Data and program
code are available upon request.
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Chapter 1
Introduction of Unconventional Monetary Policy:
Theoretical Background and Empirical Evidence
1.1 Introduction of Unconventional Monetary Policy
In December 2008, the FRB cut policy rate target range to 0-0.25%, and this
range remained there until December 2015. Between this period, the FRB
employed balance sheet policy to simulate economic activity. This policy is
referred to as Large-Scale Asset Purchases (LASP) programs, or more sim-
ply as Quantitative Easing (QE). During the same period, monetary author-
ities in other major developed countries also adopted the similar actions to
conduct themonetary policy, facing the lower bound of nominal short-term
policy rate. Monetary policy that is implemented by a monetary authority
in low interest rate environment is generally called as unconventional mon-
etary policy. In contrast, we commonly call the monetary policy which is
conducted in the way of adjustment of short-term policy rate by the open
market operation as the conventional monetary policy. In such sense, mon-
etary policy conducted by adjusting the balance sheet of central bank, is
unconventional. Among all central banks of developed countries, as the
first central bank that begun to implement unconventional monetary pol-
icy, since 1999, Bank of Japan (BoJ) has more than 15 years’ experience of
the practice of unconventional monetary policy. Table 2.3 summarizes the
major regimes of monetary policy adopted by BoJ since 1999. In this doc-
toral thesis, the main research objective is the unconventional monetary
policy conducted by BoJ from 1999/Feb/2 to 2016/Jan/29. Although we
have already known that the zero is not the actual lower bound of nominal
interest rate given the fact that several central banks have already allowed
negative interest rates, it is better to refer the minimum possible level of the
nominal interest rate as the effective lower bound (ELB) than themore com-
mon ZLB, but in this doctoral thesis, the negative interest rate policy and
the yield curve control policy are out of our research scope. We still use the
ZLB as the only terminology of the lower bound on nominal interest rate
through whole doctoral thesis consistently.
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Note that the adjustment of central bank’s balance sheet is not the only
way to implement unconventional monetary policy. Claudio and Anna
(2016) provides a good summary of unconventional monetary policy from
both academic view and practical view. Table 1.1 gives a brief summary
of all options of unconventional monetary policy and the central banks’
actions. In this doctoral, we mainly focus on the balance sheet policy con-
ducted by BoJ. The data used in all empirical works in this doctoral thesis
are before the start of the negative interest rate policy of BoJ. Let us empha-
size once more in advance that the negative interest rate policy and yield
curve control policy are out of our research scope.
Unconventional Monetary Policy
Central banks
FRB BoE ECB BoJ
Balance sheet policy
Credit policy yes yes yes yes
Quasi-debt management policy yes yes yes yes
Bank reserve policy no no no yes
Forward guidance on interest rates
Calender-based Qualitative yes no no noQuantitative yes no yes no
State-contingent Qualitative yes yes no yesQuantitative no yes no yes
Negative interest rates no no yes yes
Yield curve control no no no yes
Table 1.1: Policy Options of Unconventional Monetary Policy
The central bank in ZLB environment can’t lower the policy rate, but
can make announcements about the forward guidance of future path of
the policy rate, expanding its balance sheet, and change its balance sheet’s
portfolio, it may be difficult to develop a summary measure of monetary
policy. Our approach in this doctoral thesis follows Wu and Xia (2016) and
Krippner (2015) that use the estimated shadow rate as a comprehensive
and consistent measure of monetary policy stance. When the actual short-
term rate is positive, the estimated shadow rate corresponds to the actual
short-term rate. When the actual short-term rate is fixed at its lower bound,
given the condition that unconventional monetary policy can be effective
at reducing long-term interest rates, even though the actual policy rate has
not changed, the shadow rate will be below the policy rate and its level
can proxy for the impact of the unconventional monetary policy. Than we
can use the estimated shadow rate in econometric procedures to evaluate
the effects of unconventional monetary policy. This is the basic logic of this
doctoral thesis.
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1.2 Theoretical Background of Unconventional Mon-
etary Policy
We give some explanations about the theoretical background of unconven-
tional monetary policy in this section.
1.2.1 Balance Sheet Policy
We survey two recently developed DSGE models that are designed to as-
sess the impact of balance sheet policy. In Harrison (2011)’s model, a port-
folio rebalancemechanism is used to capture the effect of QE. It implies that
even the policy rate is constrained by the ZLB, the monetary authority has
some ability to reduce the premium by purchasing the long-term govern-
ment bonds. In the Chapter 5 of this doctoral thesis, we also use a similar
calibrated DSGEmodel with portfolio rebalancemechanism to quantify the
different scenarios of QE policy conducted by BoJ. The simulation shows
that a long-lasting QE policy has stronger initial impact on real variables
and the decreasing of long-term interest rate is also long-lasting. More de-
tails are given in Chapter 5. Since 1999, even the name of unconventional
monetary policy conducted by BoJ has changed many times, ”Quantitative
Easing”, ”Comprehensive Monetary Easing”, ”Quantitative and Qualita-
tive Easing”, but the nature of these programs are almost same, purchase
of government bond and enlargement of the balance sheet.
The Gertler and Karadi (2011) model is amodel of unconventional mon-
etary policy with capital and financial intermediation. The unconventional
monetary policy in this model is interpreted as expanding central bank
credit intermediation to offset a disruption of private financial intermedia-
tion, in another word, so-called ”credit easing” , ”lending faculty” or ”capi-
tal injection”. Within their framework, the central bank is less efficient than
private intermediaries at making loans but it has the advantage of being
able to elastically obtain funds by issuing risk-less government debt. Un-
like private financial intermediaries, the central bank is not balance sheet
constrained. During a crisis, the balance sheet constraints on private in-
termediaries tighten, raising the net benefits from central bank intermedi-
ation. These benefits may be substantial even if the ZLB constraint on the
nominal interest rate is not binding. But in the case that the ZLB constraint
is binding, these net benefits may be significantly enhanced. The reason
that why we don’t adopt the framework of Gertler and Karadi (2011) is
that the case for BoJ is little different from the FRB or BoE. Financial inter-
mediaries in Japan don’t suffer much from the influence of financial crisis,
the reason that why BoJ implements unconventional monetary policy is to
stimulate the real economy and push-up the low price level that lasts for
many years. But for FRB and BoE, the situation is different.
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1.2.2 Forward Guidance Policy
As the standard methodology of macroeconomics, New Keynesian Dy-
namic Stochastic General Equilibrium (NK-DSGE1) model provides some
theoretical insights about how to conduct monetary policy in the ZLB en-
vironment. We present a numerical example here to demonstrate the ”op-
timal discretion versus optima commitment” in the situation that the nom-
inal policy rate is constrained by the ZLB.
xt = Etxt+1   1s
⇣
it  Etpt+1   rNt
⌘
pt = bEtpt+1 + kxt
it   0
xt represents the output gap, which is defined as the difference between ac-
tual output level with price rigidity and natural output level under flexible
price. pt is inflation rate whose dynamics follow New Keynesian Phillips
Curve (NKPC) derived under the price rigidity mechanism of Calvo (1983).
it is nominal interest rate, which is generally considered as a controllable
policy instrument of central bank. But under the ZLB environment, the
central bank can’t lower nominal interest rate it further, which can be con-
sidered as a constraint condition it   0. rNt is natural rate which is decided
by exogenous technology progress. i = rN = b 1   1 holds at the steady
state with zero inflation and closed output gap. At the initial period, the
economy is at its steady state with xt = pt = 0. Let us consider a situation
that economic recession caused by the unexpected slowdown of exogenous
technology progress. Such unexpected slowdown of exogenous technology
progress leads to the decreasing of rNt to a negative value  #. rNt remains
at that negative value from period 1 to period tT. From period tT + 1, rNt
takes again its steady state value. Under the perfect foresight equilibrium,
what should the central bank do to conduct is monetary policy in response
to such shock given the non-negativity constraint on it?
Given it   0, it = Etpt+1+ rNt  s (xt  Etxt+1)   0. The non-negativity
constraint on it can be written as xt  1s
 
Etpt+1 + rNt + sEtxt+1
 
. Given
Â•t=0 btEt
 
p2t + lx2t
 
as the objective loss function of central bank2, solving
this problem under optimal discretionary policy and optimal commitment
policy leads to the equilibrium paths of model variables showed in follow-
ing figures3.
1In Appendix 1, we derive a standard NK-DSGE model. Here we use it to represent the
nominal interest rate in replace of rBt used in Appendix 1.
2For the micro-foundation of central bank’s quadratic loss function, please refer to
Rotemberg and Woodford (1999), Woodford (2003), Galı´ (2015), Miao (2014) and Walsh
(2017).
3For the algorithm of solving rational expectation model under perfect foresight, please
refer to Chapter 5 of Galı´ (2015). The numerical example demonstrated here also uses the
same method and calibration of Galı´ (2015).
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Figure 1.1: Equilibrium Path of Inflation Rate
Figure 1.2: Equilibrium Path of Output Gap
Figure 1.3: Equilibrium Path of Nominal Interest Rate
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Figure 1.4: Equilibrium Path of Natural Interest Rate
From these figures, we can find the equilibrium paths of inflation, out-
put gap, nominal interest rate given the same path of natural interest rate.
These figures show that the optimal commitment policy has better perfor-
mance than the optimal discretion policy. An unexpected drop in natural
interest rate leads to the decreasing of nominal interest rate to its lower
bound 0%. Commitment on the future path of nominal interest rate, a
credible promise made by the central bank to keep nominal interest rate
low for an extended long period even beyond the time when the adverse
demand shock4 is gone and inflation and output gap would start recov-
ering, reduces the initial impact of such adverse shock, which means the
less loss of welfare. This finding provides the theoretical background of
the so-called ”forward guidance” adopted by the FRB, ECB, BoE, BoJ and
other central banks during the Great Recession from 2007 to 2013 when
policy rates were constrained by the lower bound. There are many times
that BoJ made a statement that says ”keeping interest rate low for an ex-
tended period even though the economy starts recovery”. This is called as
”Jikanjiku” policy in Japanese. The economic foundation can be found in
the previous numerical example.
1.3 Empirical Evidence of Unconventional Monetary
Policy
Most of empirical works focus on the effects of QE policy on the bond yields
and asset prices in financial market and on the real variables of macroe-
conomy. The effects on the financial market are investigated by the non-
structural econometric procedures. Most of these works confirm the ef-
fect of QE that QE can lower the term spread of long-term bond yield and
risk premium of risk asset, also push up the stock price and exchange rate
(depreciation). Claudio and Anna (2016) summaries the related empirical
4The decreasing of natural interest rate caused by the slowdown of exogenous technol-
ogy process can be considered as an adverse demand shock here, because rNt appears in
New Keynesian IS equation.
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results. About the effects of QE policy on the macroeconomy, several au-
thors have applied DSGEmodels to simulate the effects of QE policy. Chen,
Curdı´a and Ferrero (2012) simulated the effects of a QE program in an es-
timated DSGE model with segmented financial markets and a transaction
cost that limits arbitrage. The mechanism in their model is similar to the
model of Chapter 5 that the arbitrage can’t hold when the management
cost of portfolio exists. Del Negro et al. (2016) developed a DSGE model
to assess the FRB’s policy. They found that the liquidity injection provided
by the FRB during the global financial crisis did help avert another Great
Depression. Baumeister and Benati (2012) estimated a time-varying VAR
model with stochastic volatility to evaluate the impact of a decreasing in
the long-term interest rate on the inflation and output. Wu and Xia (2016)
estimated the shadow rate and used the estimated shadow rate in a FAVAR
model with many real variables. They found that the impact of the esti-
mated shadow rate on macroeconomic variables was similar to the esti-
mated impact of the funds rate target in the prior zero interest rate period.
Ugai (2007) provides a comprehensive survey about the empirical works
of 2001-2006 QE policy of BoJ. Most of these empirical works use VAR
models as the methodology. Given different specifications of VAR mod-
els, although there exists differences about the effects of QE in the scale, the
effects of QE have been confirmed.
1.4 Summary
Since the financial crisis, there have beenmany literatures that have studied
unconventional monetary policy from either empirical perspective or theo-
retical perspective. We can’t survey all of these studies in this introductory
chapter. These exists a consensus that the unconventional monetary policy
does have effect on real economy, but the exact channels through which the
unconventional monetary policy affects the activity of macroeconomy are
not very clear.
Balance sheet policy is more convenient to be specified in a structural
model, but the forward guidance is very difficult to model in an economic
fashion because it affects the public’s belief and expectation about the fu-
ture path of monetary policy. But how the expectation affects the current
economic decisions is hard to describe in a structural economic model.
Even the central bank can announce the future path of monetary policy,
there exists uncertainty. So in this doctoral thesis, we use the estimated
shadow rate as a measure of monetary policy without distinguishing the
specified mechanism of all these unconventional monetary policies.
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Chapter 2
Estimating the Monetary Policy Measures of Japan in
Shadow/ZLB Term Structure Model
2.1 Introduction
Before the 2007-2008 global financial crisis, nominal short interest rates gen-
erally evolved above the zero lower bound (ZLB) and the central banks in
major developed countries generally chose short interest rate, which is also
known as policy rate such as Federal Funds Rate (FFR) in US, as the direct
operating target of the monetary policy. But after the global financial crisis,
central banks in major countries, expect China, have to face the untradi-
tional challenges from the ZLB constraint. The conventional monetary pol-
icy, for example, the most typical one is the adjustment of short policy rate,
is not practical and operative anymore in the ZLB environment and the
unconventional monetary policies, such as large scale of asset purchases
of government bonds and forward guidance on public expectation forma-
tion, have been adopted to provide further stimulus to economy, stopping
recession and stabilizing financial system.
In the non-ZLB environment assumed by the orthodox macroeconomic
theory, short interest rate is a useful measure for monitoring the stance of
monetary policy1. The practice of monetary policy in the central banks of
major developed countries also have proved this point. But facing the ZLB
constraint, short interest rate evolves near the neighborhood of ZLB and it
can’t provide useful information about the stance of monetary policy.
GaussianAffine Term StructureModel (GATSM)which is awidely used
non-structural econometric methodology to fit the term structure of inter-
est rates can provide good description of the dynamics of the yield curve in
many macro-financial applications, but when short interest rates are near
the ZLB, the performance of GATSM is deficient and unable to provide sat-
isfied fitness of data, just like DSGE modeling, another standard method-
ology in macroeconomics. Also, in the ZLB environment, the short interest
1This is true for the most of central banks in developed countries that choose the short
interest rate as the operating target of monetary policy.
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rates are ”sticky” which means that they tend to keep approximately static
around the ZLB with lower volatilities for an extended long period of time.
This phenomenon can be visually confirmed in Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2 in
Section 2.3.1, which show that the short interest rates in Japan have experi-
enced a long period of the ZLB since 1999. Ordinary GATSMs are unable to
accommodate this kind of stickiness. In the ordinary GATSM framework,
interest rates can evolve below the ZLB to take negative values implicitly,
but it is inconsistent with the actual observed data and has less economic
implications for practical purpose.
In the ZLB environment, the economic agents generally choose to hold
currency and receive zero return actually rather than accept a negative in-
terest rate. This provides the intuition of how to solve the issue of nega-
tive interest rates in GATSM framework. Shadow/ZLB-GATSM proposed
by Krippner (2012) use a GATSM to represent the shadow term structure
which is the term structure that would exist if the currencies were not avail-
able. If short interest rates are not restricted by the ZLB and evolve above
the ZLB, shadow/ZLB-GATSM provides same results as general GATSMs
do. But shadow/ZLB-GATSM can provide an mathematical-consistent ad-
justment to ensure that interest rates are constrained by the ZLB explicitly.
According to Krippner (2015c), this adjustment is effectively the optional-
ity form the availability of physical currency as an alternative to the neg-
ative interest rates below the ZLB2. Another important reason is that the
shadow/ZLB-GATSM can provide three useful indicators, Shadow Short
Interest Rate (SSR), Expected Time to Zero (ETZ) and Effective Monetary
Stimulus (EMS) which can show the stance of monetary policy in the ZLB
environment. These indicators can be used as the measures of monetary
policy instead of short policy rate because the short policy rate has already
lost its effectiveness in the ZLB environment.
Given this background, we estimated a shadow/ZLB-GATSM for Japan
and used the estimation results to evaluate the stance of monetary policy
in Japan. The remaining of this chapter is organized as follows. We review
the general GATSM and introduce its extension in the ZLB environment in
Section 2.2.1. Thenwe specify a two-factor shadow/ZLBGATSM in Section
2.2.2. In Section 2.2.3, we talk about the data and estimation and then give
the estimation results. In Section 2.4, we use the main results, three mea-
sures of monetary policy to evaluate the stance of monetary policy in Japan.
We also check the relationships between these measures and other macroe-
conomic variables. The Section 2.5 concludes the chapter. Some technical
details such as mathematical derivations will be provided in Appendix for
reference.
2For detailed discussions, please refer to Krippner (2015c), p44.
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2.2 GATSMand its Extension in the ZLB Environment
In this section, we review the derivation of GATSM and the related cal-
culations in a general continuous time specification3. Then we turn to il-
lustrate its extension in the ZLB environment, the shadow/ZLB-GATSM
framework which can represent the shadow term structure in the ZLB en-
vironment.
2.2.1 Generic Specification of GATSM
The short interest rate rt at time t can be represented as a linear function of
the vector of state variables xt,
rt = a0 + b>0 xt
where rt is the shortest maturity4 interest rate of the yield curve as a scalar
and a0 is a constant scalar. xt is a N ⇥ 1 vector containing N state variables
[x1,t, x2,t, · · · , xN,t]>. b0 is a N ⇥ 1 vector containing the weight5 for each
state variable6. Under the objective P measure7, xt follows a correlated
vector Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process8:
dxt =  kP
⇣
xt   qP
⌘
dt+ sdWPt
where qP is a N ⇥ 1 constant vector which represents the mean level of
xt in long-run. kP is a N ⇥ N constant parameter matrix that controls the
deterministic mean reversion of xt to its long-run mean level qP. s is a
N ⇥ N constant variance-covariance matrix of innovations to xt. dWPt is a
N ⇥ 1 vector containing independent Wiener process [dW1,t, · · · , dWN,t]>
with each component dWPn,t ⇠ N(0, 1)
p
dt where N(0, 1) is the standard
normal distribution. This stochastic process can be solved by using method
of variation of constants9. Define a function f (xt, t) = ek
Ptxt and differenti-
ate two sides with respect to t, then apply Ito’s lemma.
d f (xt, t)
dt
= kPek
Ptxtdt+ ektdxt = kPek
PtqPdt+ ek
PtsdWPt
3Continuous time specification can give a closed-form solution with higher traceability.
4Generally, we use 3-months bond interest rate and it is essentially equal to the short
policy interest rate.
5In GATSM, each state variable can be recognized as a factor which can capture the
dynamics of short interest rate. Each element in b0 is also known as a factor loading.
6We use superscript > to represent the transposition of a matrix or vector.
7The parameters and variables with P represent the objective P measure.
8Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process can be considered as a first-order autoregressive stochastic
process in continuous time.
9To simplify the notation, we illustrate the solution by assuming xt has one factor.
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Integrating two sides of this equation10 from t to t+ t leads to
xt+t = qP + e k
Pt(xt   qP) +
Z t+t
t
e kP(t u)sdWPu
where we use u as a dummy variable to evaluate the integral over time11.
Under the risk-adjusted Q measure, the market prices of risk Pt can be
represented as a linear function of xt as
Pt = s 1 [g+ Gxt]
where g is the constant component of the market prices of risks and G de-
termines the variations in market prices of risks with respect to the state
variables xt. Since the bonds or securities in financial markets are priced
under the risk-adjusted Q measure, the process of state variables xt must
be adjusted to represent the observed term structure of interest rates by
modification of parameters12 as kQ = kP + G, qQ =
 
kQ
  1
(kPqP   g) and
dWQt = dWPt +Ptdt. Under risk-adjusted Q measure, xt still evolves as a
correlated vector Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process13.
dxt = kQ
⇣
qQ   xt
⌘
dt+ sdWQt
The dynamics of xt under the risk-adjusted Q measure can be solved as
xt+t = qQ + e k
Qt
⇣
xt   qQ
⌘
+
Z t+t
t
e kQ(t u)sdWQu
which is analogous to the counterpart under the objectivePmeasure. Eigen-
decompose N ⇥ N parameter matrix kQ as
kP = VkDV 1
10 To avoid the confusion of notation, here we use dummy variable u to evaluate the
integral over time from t to t+ t.Z t+t
t
kPxuek
Pudu+
Z t+t
t
ek
Pudxu =
Z t+t
t
ek
PukPqPdu+
Z t+t
t
sek
PudWPu
xuek
Pu
   u=t+t
u=t
 
Z t+t
t
ek
Pudxu +
Z t+t
t
ek
Pudxu = qP
⇣
ek
P(t+t)   ekP t
⌘
+
Z t+t
t
sek
PudWPu
xt+tek
P(t+t)   xtekP t = qekP(t+t)   qekP t +
Z t+t
t
sek
PudWPu
11If we need to calculate the double integral over time, we use u and s to evaluate them.
12To avoid confusion, note that Pt and g are both N ⇥ 1 vector and G is N ⇥ N matrix.
Here we consider the general specification of GATSMwith N state variables in vector xt, so
the dimension of variables and parameters are all N-dimensions.
13The parameters and variables with Q mean the modification under risk-adjusted Q
measure.
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where V contains the eigenvectors of kP in columns and kD is diagonal
matrix containing eigenvalues [k1, k2, · · · , kN ] in its diagonal. The matrix
exponential e kPt can be represented as follows14.
e kPt = e VkDV 1t = Ve kDtV 1 = Vdiag[e k1t, · · · , e kNt]V 1
Under objective P measure, the expectation and variance of state variables
xt+t at time t are given as EPt (xt+t|xt) andVARPt (xt+t|xt),
EPt (xt+t|xt) = qP + e kPt
⇣
xt   qP
⌘
VARPt (xt+t|xt) =
Z t
0
e kPuss>e (k
P)
>
udu = VQ(t)V>
where the element at row i = 1, 2, · · · ,N and column j = 1, 2, · · · ,N is
given as follows15,
[Q(t)]ij =
Sij
ki + kj
h
1  e (ki+kj)t
i
where S = V 1ss>
 
V 1
 > is a N ⇥ N matrix. Under risk-adjusted Q
measure, xt has a similar formulation as its counterpart under objective P
14The exponential of N ⇥ N matrix can be calculated analogously as a scalar. For any
scalar x, ex can be expanded as a Taylor polynomial.
ex = 1+ x+
x2
2!
+
x3
3!
+ · · · =
•
Â
i=0
xi
i!
For N ⇥ N matrix kP, ekP can be calculated as follows.
ek
P
=
•
Â
i=0
ki
i!
= I + k +
k2
2!
+
k3
3!
+ · · ·
e kPt =
•
Â
i=0
⇥ VkDV 1t⇤i
i!
=
•
Â
i=0
V [ kDt]i V 1
i!
= V
"
•
Â
i=0
( kDt)i
i!
#
V 1 = Ve kDtV 1
e kDt = e tdiag[k1,··· ,kN ] = diag
⇥
e k1t , · · · , e kNt⇤
e kPt = Vdiag
⇥
e k1t , · · · , e kNt⇤V 1
15Conditional varianceVARPt (xt+t |xt) can be calculated as follows.
e kPtss>e (kP)
>
t = Vdiag[e k1t , · · · , e kNt ]V 1ss>
⇣
V 1
⌘>
diag[e k1t , · · · , e kNt ]V>
Define V 1ss>
 
V 1
 > as S, which is a N ⇥ N matrix with each element Sij. Perform
integral for each element of e kPuss>e (kP)
>u.Z t
0
Sije (ki+kj)udu =
Sij
ki + kj
h
1  e (ki+kj)t
i
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measure,
xt+t = qQ + e k
Qt
⇣
xt   qQ
⌘
+
Z t+t
t
e kQ(t u)sdWQu
so do its expectation and variance16 conditional on state variables xt.
EQt (xt+t|xt) = qQ + e k
Qt
⇣
xt   qQ
⌘
VARQt (xt+t|xt) =
Z t
0
e kQtss>e (k
Q)
>
tdu
Substituting EQt (xt+t|xt) into rt = a0 + b>0 xt evaluated at time point t+ t
leads to the following expression for the expected short interest rateEQt (rt+t|xt).
EQt (rt+t|xt) = a0 + b>0 EQt (xt+t|xt) = a0 + b>0 EQt
h
qQ + e kQt
⇣
xt   qQ
⌘i
The conditional variance VARQt (rt+t|xt) under risk-adjusted Q measure,
here we use notation w2t (given other parameters, the conditional variance
is a function of maturity t) also has the analogous form as its counterpart
under objective P measure.
w2t = VAR
Q
t (rt+t|xt) = b>0 VARQt (xt+t|xt)b0 =
Z t
0
b>0 e k
Quss>e (k
Q)
>
ub0du
To calculate the forward interest rate ft,t, we have to know the volatility ef-
fect Vt which captures the influence from the volatility in the short interest
rate on the expected returns. Due to Jensen’s inequality, the expected com-
pounded return from investing in a volatile short interest rate over time t
to t+ t is less than the compounded return from investing in the expected
short interest rate over same period. The volatility effect Vt can be calcu-
lated by the double integral as follows.
Vt =
Z t
0
b>0 e k
Q(t s)s

s>
Z t
s
e (k
Q)
>
(u s)b0du
 
ds
Given all above results, forward interest rate ft,t, the expected path of the
short interest rate under risk-adjusted Q measure is given by
ft,t = EQt (rt+t|xt) Vt
and the GATSM interest rate Rt,t can be obtained using the standard term
structure relationship in continuous time.
Rt,t =
1
t
Z t
0
ft,udu =
1
t
Z t
0
EQt (rt+t|xt)du 
1
t
Z t
0
Vtdu = at + b>t xt
Finally, the bond pricing with maturity t in GATSM takes an exponential
affine form.
Pt,t = e tRt,t = e tat tb
>
t xt
16Here we use EQt and VAR
Q
t to represent the conditional expectation and conditional
variance under the risk-adjusted Q measure.
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2.2.2 Shadow/ZLB-GATSM
We extend general GATSM by a intuitive modification to adapt GATSM
to the ZLB environment17. The extension of general GATSM in the ZLB
environment is firstly proposed by Krippner (2012), which is known as
shadow/ZLB-GATSM framework. In this framework, imposing ZLB re-
striction can be represented by a max operator.
rt = max{0, rt} = rt +max{ rt, 0}
Here rt means the actual short interest rate and the rt is the shadow short
interest rate. In general non-ZLB environment, rt   0, the economic agent
invests at the instantaneous interest rate rt and rt = rt. But in the ZLB envi-
ronment, rt < 0, the economic agent will choose to hold physical currency
and obtain zero return actually with rt = 0. The short interest rate under
forward t+ t risk-adjusted Q measure follows the normal distribution
rt+t|xt ⇠ N
 
ft,t,w2t
 
where ft,t and w2t have been derived in previous section. Under forward
t+ t risk-adjusted Q measure, the mean of this distribution ft,t satisfies
ft,t = EQt+t (rt+t|xt)
where EQt+t represents the expectation under forward t+ t risk-adjustedQ
measure. The conditional variance of rt+t|xt is time-invariant.
VARQt+t(rt+t|xt) = VARQt (rt+t|xt) = w2t
Given the distribution of rt+t|xt, its probability density functionPDF(rt+t|xt)
is given as follows.
PDF(rt+t|xt) = 1
wt
p
2p
exp
"
 1
2
✓
rt+t   ft,t
wt
◆2#
In practice, we allow a non-zero lower bound rL to represent the ZLBwhich
may be a very small number, approximately equal to zero but not zero
actually.
rt+t = max{rL, rt+t} = rt+t +max{rL   rt+t, 0}
The forward interest rate can be modified as
ft,t = E
Q
t+t (rt+t|xt) = EQt+t (rt+t|xt)+EQt+t (max{rL   rt+t, 0}|xt) = ft,t + zt,t
and if we set rL = 0,
ft,t = E
Q
t+t (rt+t|xt) = EQt+t (rt+t|xt)+EQt+t (max{ rt+t, 0}|xt) = ft,t + zt,t
17In this section, the notation with underbar means the restriction of the ZLB.
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whereEQt+t (rt+t|xt) = ft,t has been obtained in previous analysis. We now
evaluate another part18 zt,t in forward interest rate ft,t.
zt,t = EQt+t (max{rL   rt+t, 0}|xt) =
Z •
 •
max{rL   rt+t, 0} ·PDF(rt+t)drt+t
=
Z rL
 •
(rL   rt+t) ·PDF(rt+t)drt+t +
Z •
rL
0 ·PDF (rt+t) drt+t
=
Z rL
 •
(rL   rt+t) 1
wt
p
2p
exp
"
 1
2
✓
rt+t   ft,t
wt
◆2#
drt+t
= (rL   ft,t) ·

1 F
✓
ft,t   rL
wt
◆ 
+wt
1p
2p
exp
"
 1
2
✓
ft,t   rL
wt
◆2#
F
⇣
ft,t rL
wt
⌘
is the cumulative density function of standard normal distribu-
tion. Substituting zt,t into ft,t = ft,t + zt,t leads to the expression of ft,t.
ft,t = ft,t + zt,t = rL+( ft,t   rL)F
✓
ft,t   rL
wt
◆
+wt
1p
2p
exp
"
 1
2
✓
ft,t   rL
wt
◆2#
Using the results fromPriebsch (2013)19, the expected value of rt+t = max{rL, rt+t}
can be calculated as follows, which is identical to previous result.
ft,t = E
Q
t+t (rt+t|xt) =
Z rL
 •
rL
wt
p
2p
exp
"
 1
2
✓
rt+t   ft,t
wt
◆2#
drt+t
+
Z •
rL
rt+t
wt
p
2p
exp
"
 1
2
✓
rt+t   ft,t
wt
◆2#
drt+t
Given all results derived above, the interest rate Rt,t in the shadow/ZLB-
GATSM framework still has the analogous expression of the counterpart in
general GATSM framework20.
Rt,t =
1
t
Z t
0
ft,udu
2.2.3 A Two-Factor Shadow/ZLB-GATSM
In practice, there are many specifications of GATSM which all have analo-
gous structure21. Arbitrage-free Nelson and Siegel (1987) Model (ANSM)
18See Appendix for the derivation.
19For the mathematical background of this calculation, please refer to Priebsch (2013,
Appendix A.2) for how to handle a max operator in the calculation of expectation under
censored normal distribution.
20This expression does not have analytic solution in closed-form and need to be evaluated
numerically.
21See Filipovic´ (2009, Chapter 5) for introduction of this class of models.
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is one of the widely used GATSMs. Here we derive a two-factor GATSM
which has ANSM specification and then extend it in the ZLB environment
in the way introduced in previous section. Note that although we can use
three or more factors to track the dynamics of yield curve, two-factor model
can produce the level and slope components of term structure which can
explain 99.9% variation in the yield curve data and provide a realistic rep-
resentation of the yield curve in many applications with the most parsimo-
nious parameters and variables in all GATSMs which have more than one
state variable. Another reason that we choose the two-factor specification
is that according to Kim and Singleton (2012), if short interest rate is near
the ZLB, the information for estimation GATSM with three state variables
(level, slope and bow) is not enough, it is better to use two-factor model
for short interest rates in the ZLB environment. We specify the function
forms, parameters and and give the results of related calculations in this
section and use Japan government bond yield curve data to estimate it in
next section.
According to Singleton (2009), the number of parameters in a general
GATSM with two factors is 19, but the maximum number of parameters
that can be uniquely identified with econometric estimation is 12. To en-
sure the identification of parameters in estimation, a two-factor model have
some parameters to be estimated and other parameters to be calibrated.
A two-factor shadow/ZLB-GATSM has tow factors (state variables),
level component Lt and slope component St with the same weight b0 =⇥
1 1
⇤> and a calibrated constant a0 = 0.
rt = b>0 xt =
⇥
1 1
⇤ Lt
St
 
= Lt + St
kQ is a diagonal matrix

0 0
0 j
 
, and its exponential e kQt is given as
e kQt = exp
✓
 

0 0
0 j
 
t
◆
=

1 0
0 1
 
exp
✓
 

0 0
0 j
 
t
◆ 
1 0
0 1
 
=

1 0
0 e jt
 
which can be calculated by the methods described in Section 2.2.1. Given
k =

k11 k12
k21 k22
 
, G can be identified from relationships of parameters be-
tween Q and P measures, which has been introduced in Section 2.2.1. Re-
call that state variables xt =
⇥
Lt St
⇤> follow a continuous-time first-order
vector-autoregression process
xt+t = qQ + e k
Qt
⇣
xt   qQ
⌘
+
Z t+t
t
e kQ(t u)sdWu
where standard error of innovation
s =
"
s1 0
r12s2 s2
q
1  r212
#
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is a 2⇥ 2 matrix. We can rewrite this equation in a small time interval Dt
Lt+Dt
St+Dt
 
=

1 0
0 e jt
  
Lt
St
 
+

#L,t+Dt
#S,t+Dt
 
=

Lt
e jtSt
 
+

#L,t+Dt
#S,t+Dt
 
where qQ and q are given22 as qQ =
⇥
0 0
⇤> and q = ⇥q1 q2⇤>. From this
result, we can note that Lt follows a random-walk process and St evolves
as a mean-reverting process. The remaining job is just to calculate23 the ex-
pected path of the short interest rate (mean and variance), volatility effect
and forward interest rate in the fashion introduced in Section 2.2.1 and ex-
tend the results in the ZLB environment in the way introduced in Section
2.2.2.
• Expectation of short interest rate:
EQt (rt+t|xt) = Lt + e jtSt
• Variance of short interest rate:
w2t = s
2
1t + s
2
2
1  e 2jt
2j
+ 2r12s1s2
1  e jt
j
• Volatility effect:
Vt =
s21t
2
2
+
r12s1s2t
j
 
1  e jt + s2
2j2
 
1  2e jt + e 2jt 
• Forward interest rate:
ft,t = Lt+ e jtSt 

s21t
2
2
+
r12s1s2t
j
 
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22Other parameters and variables such as g and Pt can also be identified by the relation-
ships between Q and P measures introduced in Section 2.2.1.
23The details of calculation are given in Appendix for reference.
24See Appendix for deviations.
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• Shadow short interest rate:
rt = max{rL, Lt + St}
• Forward interest rate in the ZLB environment:
ft,t = rL+( ft,t   rL)F
✓
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• Interest rate with maturity t in the ZLB environment:
Rt,t =
1
t
Z t
0
ft,udu
2.3 Data and Estimation
In this section, we use the model derived in previous section and Japan’s
yield curve data to estimate this model. The results from estimation are
parameters, estimated values of two factors and fitted values of short inter-
est rate. Three monetary policy measures can be directly calculate from the
these results, which will be introduced in next section.
2.3.1 Data
The yield curve data set of Japan is Japan government bond yield data
from 1992/07/10 (Friday) to 2016/11/24 (Thursday), daily frequency of
5-business days week with 6360 observations, obtained from Bloomberg
database. To reduce the burden of computation, we chose the end of month
data as one observation for one month, then we get 293 observations from
1992M7 to 2016M11, monthly frequency. The maturity of yield curve is
from 3-months to 30-years and 3-months interest rate is adapted to be the
short interest rate rt. Interest rates with other maturities are equivalent to
be Rt,t in term structure models. The summary statistics of all 12 series are
given in Table 2.1.
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Maturity t 3M25 6M 1Y 2Y 3Y 4Y
Mean 0.46 0.47 0.51 0.63 0.77 0.94
Med 0.12 0.13 0.15 0.25 0.40 0.57
Max 4.29 4.17 4.16 4.24 4.41 4.95
Min -0.42 -0.43 -0.37 -0.36 -0.36 -0.36
Std. Dev. 0.85 0.83 0.85 0.90 0.97 1.06
Obs. 6360 6360 6360 6360 6360 6360
Maturity t 5Y 7Y 10Y 15Y 20Y 30Y
Mean 1.10 1.40 1.81 2.13 2.53 2.70
Med 0.73 1.03 1.49 1.83 2.20 2.48
Max 5.25 5.71 5.64 6.16 6.44 6.24
Min -0.37 -0.39 -0.28 -0.13 0.03 0.05
Std. Dev. 1.13 1.22 1.26 1.29 1.26 1.16
Obs. 6360 6360 6360 6360 6360 6360
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics of Japan Yield Curve Data
We can find that with the increasing of maturity, the standard deviation
also increases, which means the increasing of uncertainty of long maturity.
Note that the minimum values of yield curve data from 3-months to 15-
years are all negative. The time series plot of yield curve data is given in
Figure 2.1a and Figure 2.1b.
Figure 2.1a: Japan government Bond Yield Curve Data
From the 3D view of yield curve data, we can confirm that the yield
curves of all maturities have shifted down since 1999.
25M=Month and Y=Year.
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Figure 2.1b: Japan government Bond Yield Curve Data (3D vision)
Figure 2.2 shows the plot of 3-months bond interest rate and uncollat-
eralized overnight call rate, which is generally recognized as the official
short policy interest rate of Bank of Japan. We can find that after 1999,
these two kinds of typical short interest rates have been evolving near the
ZLB. Although during the ZLB period, Bank of Japan has adopted several
unconventional monetary policy programs and during the same period,
the macroeconomy in Japan also has experienced dramatic fluctuations,
we can’t get further information from these kinds of short interest rate if
we still consider them as the measure of monetary policy. This is why we
need shadow/ZLB-GATSM to model the short interest rate in the ZLB en-
vironment and estimate the corresponding shadow short interest rate from
shadow/ZLB-GATSM.
Figure 2.2: Short Interest Rates in Japan
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Note that money statistics and long-maturity interest rates can be po-
tentially used to quantify the stance of monetary policy in the ZLB environ-
ment. But there are some fatal defects of them. For money statistics such as
money supply or money growth, history has told us that the relationships
between money statistics and macroeconomic variables haven’t been sta-
ble and reliable since 1980s, especially in developed economies. For long-
maturity interest rates such as 10-years interest rate of government bond,
even long-maturity interest rates are not constrained by the ZLB and there
exists research that supports the view that the long-maturity interest rates
can response to monetary policy events, the fluctuations in long-maturity
interest rates can be the results of other reasons such as neutral interest
rates, inflation expectations and so on. In another word, long-maturity
interest rates are noisy measures of stance of monetary policy. Also, the
amount of large-scale asset purchase can be used as the measure of stim-
ulative degree of monetary easing, but from the results of this chapter, the
first round of monetary easing from 2001Q1 to 2006Q1, the following round
from 2010Q3 to 2013Q1 and the latest QQE from 2013Q4, the estimated
stimulative degree of monetary policy doesn’t have much difference even
the scale of asset purchase is quite different during different policy pro-
grams.
2.3.2 Estimation Methodology
GATSM is generally estimated in state-space form with Kalman filter and
maximum likelihood method. Compared to general GATSM used in the
non-ZLB environment, shadow/ZLB-GATSM has nonlinear functions of
state variables xt via the CDF or PDF of normal distribution. Iterated Ex-
tended Kalman Filter (IEKF) can handle the nonlinearity. For technical de-
tails of IEKF, please refer to Krippner (2015, pp.117-126) which provides
the instruction of IEKF in the estimation of shadow/ZLB term structure
model. Wu and Xia (2016), Baure and Rudebusch (2016) also used the same
algorithm.
A two-factor model has 11 parameters to estimate. Denote the set of all
estimated parameters as W = {rL, j, q1, q2, k11, k12, k21, k22, s1, s2, r12}. Here
we consider the lower bound of nominal interest rate rL as a parameter
to be estimated instead of setting rL = 0 directly. The estimation can be
conducted by using the Matlab code26 provided by Krippner (2015). The
state equation in state-space under objective P measure is given in discrete
26The Matlab code for estimation is available from http://www.rbnz.govt.
nz/research-and-publications/research-programme/additional-research/
measures-of-the-stance-of-united-states-monetary-policy/
matlab-code-for-krippner-2015-shadow-zlb-term-structure-model.
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time where Dt is time span between two observations.
xt = qP + e k
PDt
⇣
xt 1   qP
⌘
+ #t
Variance of innovation #t is calculated as follows.
VARP[#t] =
Z Dt
0
e kPuss>e (k
P)
>
udu
Note that Rt,t = 1t
R t
0 ft,udu is a function of state variables xt, maturity t
and other parameters, so measurement equation can be represented as
Rt,t = R(xt, t,W) + ht
where ht is a 12⇥ 1 vector of measurement errors27. The variance of mea-
surement errors which is a 12⇥ 12 diagonal matrix VAR(ht) = diag[s2h,t]
are assumed to have homoscedasticity s2h,t and to be independent to each
other. #t in state equation and ht inmeasurement equation are also assumed
to be uncorrelated to each other.
2.3.3 Estimation Results
We conducted three groups of estimation using the daily frequency data,
monthly frequency data and weekly frequency data. The monthly data
and weekly data were extracted from the original daily frequency data by
choosing end-monthly (293 observations) and end-weekly (1273 observa-
tions) observations of yield curve. To avoid the negative values in dataset,
which are not compatible with mathematical specification of the model, we
excluded the data from 2016/02/01 to 2016/11/24 for the period of QQE
with a negative interest rate28. Monthly estimates are used to match other
data which is only available in monthly frequency such as Consumer Price
Index (CPI) or uncollateralized overnight call rate.
27Because we have 12 series yield curve data with different maturities, we have to specify
12 measurement equations.
28The yield curve data from 3-months maturity to 10-years maturity begun to take neg-
ative values since the start or QQE with a negative interest rate policy, which made data
inapplicable to the computation of model estimation.
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Daily Weely Monthly
Parameters Estimates Std.Error Estimates Std.Error Estimates Std.Error
rL 0.000706 0.000011 0.000730 0.000025 0.000648 0.000064
j 0.143037 0.000768 0.138777 0.001671 0.129480 0.003335
k11 0.078780 0.002108 0.109261 0.002665 0.061399 0.001233
k12 -0.173436 0.012115 0.001283 0.000024 0.010122 0.001473
k21 0.035443 0.001775 0.059224 0.001202 0.040958 0.008651
k22 0.000358 0.000011 0.001065 0.000018 0.007225 0.000809
q1 -0.003166 0.000167 0.039420 0.002259 0.074089 0.014680
q2 -0.049843 0.003068 -0.649511 0.012159 -0.355374 0.006008
s1 0.012395 0.000103 0.011765 0.000222 0.011904 0.000438
s2 0.017150 0.000201 0.014753 0.000432 0.013264 0.000702
r12 -0.954813 0.001711 -0.925731 0.005326 -0.891964 0.013401
Table 2.2: Estimated Parameters of shadow/ZLB-GATSM
From Table 2.2, we can find that rL is a very small number, approxi-
mately equal to zero. Other parameters from three groups of estimation all
have similar values. Estimated two state variables, shadow short interest
rate are plotted in Figure 2.3. Note that each shaded area near level, slope
and shadow short interest rate are calculated from the point estimates plus
or minus their 1.96 unit estimated standard error. We plot short interest
rates in the same figure for ease of comparison. During the non-ZLB pe-
riod, the shadow interest rate has almost same path as actual short interest
rates does during non-ZLB period. But during the ZLB period, short in-
terest rates remain static near the ZLB and the shadow short interest rate
still evolves to negative values. Given these estimated series, we put them
in a time line of monetary policy events and then evaluate the stance of
monetary policy in Japan.
Figure 2.3: Estimated Factors and SSR
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2.4 QuantitativeMeasures ofMonetary Policy in Japan
Three quantitative measures can be calculated from the estimation results
and then can be used as quantitative indicators of the stance of monetary
policy. We explain these indicators one by one in Section 2.4 in a context of
monetary policy events.
2.4.1 Shadow Short Interest Rate
The concept of shadow short interest rate (SSR) was firstly proposed by
Black (1995). If the ZLB wouldn’t exist and nominal interest rate could
decrease to negative value freely, the economic agents would hold physical
currency rather than invest in government bonds. The value of this call
option that the economic agents could choose to hold currency in handwith
zero return plus the SSR is equal to zero theoretically. In another word,
the call option of holding currency would have positive value when the
economic agents expect the deep decrease of interest rates in future.
As we have already mentioned previously, the SSR is the shortest ma-
turity interest rate from the estimated shadow yield curve, which can take
negative values in the ZLB environment. We can confirm from Figure 2.4
that the SSR is approximately equal to the 3-months bond interest rate and
policy rate during the non-ZLB period. Note that the estimated results from
this paper are similar to Ichiue and Ueno (2013) or Imakubo and Nakajima
(2015).
Figure 2.4: Estimated SSR
Figure 2.5 shows themajormonetary policy regimes officially announced
by BoJ since 1999 where each colored area indicates the period of each pol-
icy regime. We can at least confirm the negative SSR levels are correlated
with the evolution of monetary policy events. Although the SSR shows
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different response to each policy event, the main trend of the SSR is the
decrease with the evolution of unconventional monetary policy from Zero
Interest Rate Policy to QQE in Japan.
The Policy Evolution of BoJ since 1999
1999-Feb-2 to 2000-Aug-11 Zero Interest Rate Policy (pink shaded area in Figure 2.5)
2001-Mar-19 to 2006-Mar-9 Quantitative Easing (yellow shaded area in Figure 2.5)
2010-Oct-5 to 2013-Mar-20 Comprehensive Monetary Easing (green shaded area in Figure 2.5)
2013-Apr-4 to 2016-Jan-29 Price Stability Target of 2% and Quantitative and Qualitative Monetary Easing (blue shaded area in Figure 2.5)
2016-Feb-16 to 2016-Sep-19 Price Stability Target of 2% and Quantitative and Qualitative Monetary Easing with a Negative Interest Rate
2016-Sep-21 to Now Price Stability Target of 2% and Quantitative and Qualitative Monetary Easing with Yield Curve Control
Table 2.3: Monetary Policy Regimes of BoJ
Figure 2.5: SSR in Different Monetary Policy Regimes
Note that it is better to consider the SSR as an ordinal measure of mon-
etary policy. The SSR can be used to track the unconventional monetary
policy events in a consistent way. Generally, more lower values are con-
sistent with more monetary stimulus, and vice versa. But in real world,
the economic agents can’t transact with negative nominal interest rates, the
change of the SSR doesn’t mean that it can have real effect to economy in
the same way as the change of policy rate in the conventional non-ZLB
environment.
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Figure 2.6: Monetary Policy Events from 2010M10 to 2016M1
Figure 2.6 is a close-up of Figure 2.5, zooming up from 2010M10 to
2016M1, the start of Comprehensive Monetary Easing to 2016M1, the end
of first phase of Quantitative and Qualitative Monetary Easing. The verti-
cal dashed lines plotted in Figure 2.6 are the indicators for the major policy
decisions made by policy board of BoJ. For most of this period, the policy
decisions are the ”maintain the status quo” or ”additional monetary easing”,
and the shadow short interest rate shows response to the policy decisions,
decreasing with more negative values. We located two policy decisions
which are ”send-off of additional monetary easing” by two blue dashed lines
at 2013/2/14 and 2013/3/7. The shadow short interest rate increased after
these two decisions in a consistent way of short interest rate in general en-
vironment. But during the same period, call rate and 3-months interest rate
all didn’t have much response to the policy changes and we can’t get any
information from these general monetary policy indicators. This is why we
should use the shadow short interest rate as a proxy of policy rate in the
ZLB environment.
Then we check the empirical relations between the shadow short inter-
est rate and the balance sheet of BoJ.
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Figure 2.7: Balance Sheet of BoJ
Bank of Japan is the first central bank which introduced unconventional
monetary policy amongmajor advanced economies. The essence of the pol-
icy programs conducted by BoJ is the large scale purchase of Japan govern-
ment bond. From the Figure 2.7, we can find since 2010M10, the balance
sheet of BoJ has increased aggressively. What is the relation between the
SSR and the size of central bank’s balance sheet? The Figure 2.8 shows
the time series plot of SSR, minus log of bond holdings and minus log of
monetary base29.
Figure 2.8: SSR and Balance Sheet of BoJ
29The pink shaded area in Figure 2.8 represents the Zero Interest Rate Policy from 1999M3
to 2000M8. The yellow shaded area shows the first round of QE from 2001M3 to 2006M3.
The green shaded area represents the comprehensive monetary easing from 2010M10 to
2013M3. The blue shaded area represents the QQE from 2013M4.
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Figure 2.9: SSR and Balance Sheet of BoJ (scatter plot)
The correlation between SSR and bond holdings (in log term) is -0.87
and the correlation between SSR and monetary base (in log term) is -0.86.
The X-Y scatter plots in Figure 2.9 also show obvious high correlation of the
SSR and the variables of balance sheet. Note that the SSR can’t be controlled
directly by the central bank in the ZLB environment30. What the central
bank can manipulate is its balance sheet. The SSR just summarizes the
stance of monetary policy. According to the empirical relation between the
SSR and the balance sheet, we can map the manipulation of the balance
sheet into the change of the SSR.
2.4.2 Expected Time to Zero
Figure 2.10 shows the another monetary policy measure in the ZLB envi-
ronment, Expected Time to Zero (ETZ). According to Krippner (2015), ETZ
can provide an implied market-based expectation of when the actual short
interest rate is expected to lift off from zero and return to its normal value
in the non-ZLB environment.
Note that from Section 2.2.2, the expected path of shadow short interest
rate is
EQt (rt+t0) = Lt + e
 jt0St = 0
where the t0 is ETZt = t0 and can be calculated from the estimated values
of state variables Lt, St and parameter j by solving the equation as t0 =
  1j ln
⇣
  LtSt
⌘
.
30In the non-ZLB environment, the SSR takes positive value which is same to the general
short policy rate. The short policy rate can be controlled by the central bank through open
market operations.
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Figure 2.10a: ETZ from 1992M7 to 2016M1
Figure 2.10b: ETZ from 2008M12 to 2010M12
Figure 2.10c: ETZ from 2011M1 to 2012M12
Figure 2.10d: ETZ from 20013M1 to 2014M12
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Figure 2.10e: ETZ from 2015M1 to 2016M1
Figure 2.10a provides the ETZ (right axis) in Japan. During the Zero
Interest Rate Policy period , Qualitative Easing period and Comprehensive
Monetary Easing period, the ETZ shows consistent path with the evolution
of monetary policy, especially the start and end of each policy. Since the
QQE is still ongoing, the ETZ is a good measure providing the information
about how long economic agents are likely to face the ZLB in the future
and when and how the central bank should consider the exit strategy or
forward guidance. For example, at the end point of the sample, 2016M1,
the ETZ is almost 10 years. Adding this expected horizon of the ZLB en-
vironment provides a range from 2016M1 to 2026M1. This range may be
the reference for BoJ’s forward guidance about the time point of the end
of the ZLB environment. Though BoJ doesn’t officially announce the time
point of the end of the ZLB environment, the ETZ can still provide the
market-implied expectation about how long the ZLB will continue. Since
there doesn’t exist market survey about this expectation, the ETZ is the only
available measure if we want to know it. From Figure 2.10, we can imply
that the ZLB environment in Japan will last for quite long time, especially
from 2013M4, the start of first phase of QQE. There exists an obvious trend
that the ETZ will increase with the deepening of QQE.
2.4.3 Effective Monetary Stimulus
Before we introduce the concept of Effective Monetary Stimulus (EMS), let
we firstly consider the neutral interest rate of economy. The neutral interest
rate is the short interest rate when the economy will achieve its long-run
equilibrium level, the balance of investment and saving. If policy rate is
equal to the neutral interest rate, the monetary policy is neutral to economy,
neither easy and stimulative, nor tight and suppressive. In the non-ZLB
environment, if the policy rate is below the neutral rate with an expecta-
tion that the policy rate will finally revert to the neutral rate level as time
evolves, the EMS can be calculated as the area between the expected path of
the short interest rate and the neutral interest rate. In the ZLB environment,
the explicit stance of monetary policy is a zero interest rate policy but with
the expectation that the short interest rate will rise to normal positive level
at some horizon in the future and finally return to its neutral level. The
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EMS has consistent interpretation in both non-ZLB and ZLB environment.
Now we explain the EMS. We have already showed that the short in-
terest rate rt = Lt + St has its expected path EQt (rt+t|xt) = Lt + e jtSt in
Section 2.2.3. For the long-horizon t ! •, the expectation of the shadow
short interest rate is
lim
t!•E
Q
t (rt+t|xt) = Lt
and the expected path of short interest rate relative to its long-run expected
value is
lim
t!•E
Q
t (rt+t|xt) max{0,EQt (rt+t|xt)} =
(
Lt, if EQt (rt+t|xt) < 0
 e jtSt, if EQt (rt+t|xt)   0
where Lt is the estimate of the neutral interest rate at time t. The stance of
monetary policy can be identified from this policy-neutral interest rate gap.
The EMS is the area that can be calculated from the integral of this gap with
respect to t with a range (0,•).
EMSt =
Z •
0
⇣
Lt  max{0,EQt (rt+t|xt)}
⌘
dt
If EQt (rt+t|xt)   0 at all horizons t 2 (0,•), the EMS is
EMSt =
Z •
0
  e jtSt  dt =  Stj
and if EQt (rt+t|xt) < 0, for EQt (rt+t|xt) is a monotonic function of horizon
t, if EQt (rt+t|xt) has an intersection with zero at horizon t0, it has only
one intersection and EQt (rt+t|xt) < 0 holds for values of t < t0 when
rt = St + Lt < 0. t0 can be solved as follows by setting EQt (rt+t|xt) = 0.
Lt =  Ste jt0 ) t0 =   1j log
✓
 Lt
St
◆
The EMS in this case is given by following integral.
EMSt =
Z t0
0
Ltdt +
Z •
t0
  Ste jt  dt = t0Lt   Stj e jt0
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Figure 2.11: Effective Monetary Stimulus
Figure 2.12: Effective Monetary Stimulus (normalized)
Figure 2.11 shows the monthly estimate of EMS. To get a intuitive view
of the EMS, we normalized themonthly estimate of EMS by EMSt mean(EMSt)std.er(EMSt)
and plot the SSR and call rate together in Figure 2.12, we can find that
the SSR and EMS have a consistent relationship in the ZLB environment,
lower SSR coincides with higher EMS, just like that the policy rate and EMS
have in the non-ZLB environment. When SSR rises, the EMS decreases and
vice versa. The estimated EMS shows very good traceability of monetary
policy in Japan. We also calculated the mean of EMS in different schemes
of monetary policy. The mean of EMS in QE (and comprehensive monetary
easing) from 2001M3 to 2013M3 is 36% and the mean of EMS in QQE from
2013M4 to 2016M1 is 44%, which shows the QQE is more aggressive than
the previous QE, but only 8% of increasing. We can conclude that both EMS
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and ETZ show very accurate and consistent traceability of monetary policy.
xt = b0 + b1xt 1 + b2EMSt 3 + #t
Coefficient Point Estimate Std.Error t-Statistic P-value
b0  0.741⇤⇤⇤ 0.180  4.116 0.0005
b1 0.574⇤⇤⇤ 0.055 10.525 0.0000
b2 0.686⇤⇤⇤ 0.189 3.638 0.0015
R2 = 0.86 Sample: 2010Q1 2016Q1
xt = Output Gap EMSt = normalized EMS
Table 2.4: Regression of Output Gap on EMS
xt = b0 + b1xt 1 + b2EMSt 3 + #t
Coefficient Point Estimate Std.Error t-Statistic P-value
b0  0.164 0.115  1.422 0.1689
b1 0.210⇤ 0.111 1.896 0.0711
b2 0.297⇤⇤ 0.139 2.130 0.0446
R2 = 0.16 Sample: 2010Q1 2016Q1
xt = Inflation EMSt = normalized EMS
Table 2.5: Regression of Inflation on EMS
If the stimulative degree of monetary policy can be represented by EMS,
what is the empirical relationship between EMS and macroeconomic vari-
ables31? To figure out this question, we run simple regressions of output
gap and inflation on normalized EMS. As the results of estimation showed
in Table 2.4, from 2010Q1 to 2016Q1, the stimulative degree of monetary
policy represented by normalized EMS has a positive effect on output gap.
1% increasing of the EMS leads to 0.686% increasing of output gap. We also
tried the regression of normalized EMS and GDP deflator-based inflation.
From Table 2.5, we can find that 1% increasing of the EMS leads to 0.297%
increasing of inflation, which is less than the effect of EMS on output gap.
This may imply that the unconventional monetary policy of BoJ is more
sensitive to output, but less sensitive to inflation.
31The data of output gap and inflation is same as that used in the estimation of NK-DSGE
and TVP-SV VAR model in Chapter 3. Please refer to Figure 3.3.
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2.5 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we estimated a two-factor shadow/ZLB-GATSM that can
be used to model short interest rate in the ZLB environment. We can derive
three useful monetary policy measures from this model which can provide
the consistent view of the stance of monetary policy in Japan.
The SSR acts as a proxy of general short interest rate in the ZLB envi-
ronment. We can find that the SSR has already decreased to -6%, which
means that the value of holding physical currency is +6%. The ETZ shows
that the expected horizon of the ZLB in Japan will last for at least 8 years
at the end of 2015. As far as we are concerned, this research firstly pro-
vided the answer about how long the ZLB will last in Japan because there
doesn’t exist any research or survey about this expectation of the market.
The EMS provides a consistent way to track the stance of monetary policy
in Japan. Generally, lower SSR means further stimulus of monetary pol-
icy, but from the Figure 2.11 and Figure 2.12, we can find that the peak
stimulus of QQE is not stronger than the first time of monetary easing con-
ducted by BoJ from 2001 to 2006, but the mean of EMS in QQE is still 8%
larger than the mean of EMS in previous scheme of policy. This may imply
that the monetary easing policy, large-scale purchasing of the government
bond and increasing money supply, is more aggressive than before, but
approaching its limit, no matter how many government bond have been
purchased, the whole volume of government bond is finite and it is not far
from the limit of QQE. We also found that the stimulative degree of mon-
etary policy represented by EMS has a positive effect (+0.686%) on output
gap and a relatively small positive effect (+0.294%) on inflation averagely
from 2010Q1 to 2016Q1. Note that we have already confirmed that the SSR
and EMS can be used as measures of monetary policy, these measures can
be directly used in other econometric procedures to evaluate the effects of
monetary policy.
We also expanded the estimation period from 2016/1/29, the start of
QQE with a negative interest rate policy to latest available data, but the
mathematical specification of the model in this chapter has some defects
when dealing with negative values of interest rate data. The modification
is still ongoing. This chapter provides purely empirical results from a two-
factor shadow/ZLB-GATSM and we will use the results from this chapter
for further research.
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Chapter 3
Empirical Investigation of Shadow Rate
3.1 Introduction
When the short nominal interest rate is at or near zero, central banks have
to face the problems incurred by the ZLB because the ZLB invalidates the
implementation of conventional monetary policy, the adjustment of short
policy rate. Facing the constraint of ZLB, central banks conduct unconven-
tional monetary policy to stabilize and stimulate the economy. This is what
Japan economy has experienced and Bank of Japan has done since 1999
when the call rate decreased to a very low level near zero. The Great Re-
cession incurred by the 2007-2008 global financial crisis brought the same
problem to US, UK and Euro area. Besides the practical policy issues faced
by the monetary authorities in advanced economies, the ZLB and the re-
lated unconventional monetary policy also pose academic issues and new
challenges for macroeconomic research.
New Keynesian Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (NK-DSGE)
model is one of themainworkhorses inmodernmonetarymacroeconomics.
But when the ZLB constraint on the short nominal interest rate binds, un-
fortunately, NK-DSGE models have deficient performance and undesired
economic implications, leading to implausible and weird policy paradoxes.
As a standard methodology for monetary policy analysis, NK-DSGE
model in the ZLB environment predicts that positive temporary supply
shocks have contractionary effects and vice versa, negative supply shocks
have expansionary effects. Also, fiscal and forward guidance multipliers
can be implausibly larger than one. All these conclusions from the standard
NK-DSGE models are inconsistent with economic intuition and empirical
facts1. Besides the misleading policy implications, the ZLB also brings
many technical problems in DSGE methodology. The explicit introduc-
tion of the ZLB constraint into DSGE models accompanies with structural
break or nonlinear kink. Such kind of nonlinearity invalidates the linear
1Wieland (2015) and Garı´n et al. (2016) showed similar impulse responses of output to a
supply shock in both ZLB and non-ZLB environment.
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approximation and the Kalman filter. Some researchers use global projec-
tion method and the particle filter to deal with the nonlinearity in solution
and estimation of DSGEmodels, but these methods are technically difficult
and demand for numerous computation.
Wu and Zhang (2016) established the equivalence between shadow rate
and unconventional monetary policy in a standard NK-DSGE model. The
equivalence between shadow rate and unconventional monetary policy is
established on the empirical findings that have shown the highly correla-
tion between the quantity of government bond purchase and the estimated
shadow rate. For the case of Bank of Japan, these empirical findings can be
confirmed in Figure 2.8 and Figure 2.9. The shadow rate can take both pos-
itive and negative values and show consistent response to monetary policy
events in both non-ZLB and ZLB environment. Introducing the shadow
rate into a DSGE model can provide more insights for the propagation and
amplification mechanism of unconventional monetary policy without in-
troducing the complications incurred by the ZLB constraint.
We use the shadow rate estimated from a shadow/ZLB-GATSM in Chap-
ter 2 as the data for the estimation of a NK-DSGE model where the general
policy rate is replaced by the shadow rate during ZLB period. Then we use
the NK-DSGE model with shadow rate to do some monetary policy analy-
sis for Japan economy. This may be a circuitous route, but the logic is valid
and consistent from the beginning to the end. Also, this approach salvages
the DSGEmodels from the nonlinearity incurred by the ZLB. Standard pro-
cedures such as the linear approximation and the Kalman filter can be used
instead of complicated nonlinear solution and estimation techniques.
To check the applicability of shadow rate in the non-structural econo-
metricmodel, we also estimate a TimeVarying Parameter-Stochastic Volatil-
ity Vector Autoregression (TVP-SV VAR) model with the same data used in
previous DSGE analysis. By using TVP-SV VARmodel, we can plot the im-
pulse response function for each time point to check the empirical dynamic
relationship of macroeconomic variable and monetary policy.
The remaining of this paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 shows
the equivalence between shadow rate and unconventional monetary pol-
icy. In Section 3.2.1, we estimate a NK-DSGE model with shadow rate. Sec-
tion 3.2.2 checks the empirical results such as historical decomposition and
impulse response from the estimated NK-DSGE model. Section 3.3 shows
another similar analysis by TVP-SV VAR model. This exercise also proves
that even though the shadow rate during ZLB period is negative, it is still
robust to use the shadow rate in the econometric procedures of monetary
policy. Section 3.4 concludes this chapter and gives the prospect for further
research.
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3.2 Shadow Rate in NK-DSGEModel
According to the empirical evidence of shadow rate presented in Section
2.4.1, we introduce shadow rate into the standard NK-DSGE model. For
general NK-DSGE model, the economic agents face risk-free short rate rt
and hold risk-free bond. rt is generally recognized as the short policy rate
which can be controlled by the central bank. In actual, the relevant inter-
est rates affecting economic agents’ decisions are private interest rates rBt ,
through which both conventional and unconventional monetary policies
transmit into the economy.
Generally, the private interest rates rBt can be represented as the sum of
risk-free short rate rt plus a time-varying risk premium rPt
rBt = rt + r
P
t
where rt is assumed that can be adjusted by the conventional monetary
policy of the central bank. Empirical works such as Gagnon et al. (2011),
Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) and Hamilton andWu (2012)
advocate that the large-scale asset purchase by the central banks can reduce
the risk premium which means
∂rPt
∂bGt
< 0
where bGt is the log of bond holdings of the central bank. This is known as
the risk premium channel of QE.
Figure 3.1: Credit Spread and Balance Sheet of BoJ
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Figure 3.2: Credit Spread and Balance Sheet of BoJ (scatter plot)
The Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2 show the relation between credit spread
and the balance sheet of BoJ. The credit spread used here is defined as the
difference between the S&P Japan Corporate Bond Index and S&P Japan
Government Bond Index. The correlation of credit spread and bond hold-
ings (in log term) is -0.80 and the correlation of credit spread and monetary
base (in log term) is -0.81.
According to the regression lines in Figure 3.2, we assume that the re-
sponse of risk premium rPt to bond holdings bGt follows a simple linear form
rPt = r
P   g
⇣
bGt   bG
⌘
+ #Pt
where  g = ∂rPt
∂bGt
< 0, rP is the constant component of risk premium and
#Pt is the exogenous time-varying component of risk premium which is in-
terpreted as the liquidity preference shock in Campbell et al. (2017). In the
non-ZLB environment, bGt = bG, rPt = rP + #Pt such that
rBt = rt + r
P
t = rt + r
P + #Pt
which means that the private interest rate is the short rate controlled by the
central bank plus risk premium. When rt is restricted by the ZLB, approxi-
mately rt = 0 and
rBt = r
P   g
⇣
bGt   bG
⌘
+ #Pt
through which the unconventional monetary policy affects risk premium
to reduce private interest rate and stimulate the economy. According to the
empirical evidence of the shadow rate showed by Figure 2.8 and Figure 2.9,
we also assume that the shadow rate has a same response to the log of bond
holdings in a linear form like
st =  g
⇣
bGt   bG
⌘
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then
rBt = st + r
P + #Pt
can capture the both conventional and unconventional monetary policies.
In the non-ZLB environment, st = rt > 0, bGt = bG and rBt = rt+ rP+ #Pt ,
the New Keynesian IS curve2 is
xt = Etxt+1   1s
⇣
rBt  Etpt+1   rNt
⌘
= Etxt+1   1s
⇣
rt + rP + #Pt  Etpt+1   rNt
⌘
= Etxt+1   1s (rt  Etpt+1) + #
x
t
= Etxt+1   1s (st  Etpt+1) + #
x
t
where #xt =   1s
 
rP + #Pt   rNt
 
is a compound of exogenous shocks. The
risk premium shock #Pt and rNt =   ln b+ s(1+h)s(1 a)+a+h
 
Et Aˆt+1   Aˆt
 
can’t
be identified separately, so we denote the compound of these exogenous
shocks as a demand shock #xt . In the ZLB environment, the New Keynesian
IS curve is
xt = Etxt+1   1s
⇣
rBt  Etpt+1   rNt
⌘
= Etxt+1   1s
⇣
st + rP + #Pt  Etpt+1   rNt
⌘
= Etxt+1   1s (st  Etpt+1) + #
x
t
which is same as its counterpart in the non-ZLB environment. Finally, we
define a Taylor rule of shadow rate
st = jsst 1 + (1  js) (jxxt + jppt) + #st
where #st is the monetary policy shock and js is a smoothing parameter
of interest rate. jp > 1 guarantees the existence a unique, non-explosive
equilibrium3.
3.2.1 Estimation of NK-DSGEModel with Shadow Rate
From the analysis in Section 3.2, we can find the NK-DSGE model with
shadow rate has the same formulation in both ZLB and non-ZLB environ-
ment. Because we have three observable variables, output gap, inflation
2For the derivation of NK-DSGE model, please refer to Appendix for Chapter 1.
3See Bullard and Mitra (2002) for a proof.
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rate and shadow rate, we add a shock term to the New Keynesian Phillips
Curve to avoid the stochastic singularity in estimation4.
xt = Etxt+1   1s (st  Etpt+1) + #
x
t
pt = bEtpt+1 + kxt + #pt
st = jsst 1 + (1  js) (jxxt + jppt) + #st
All shocks follow autoregressive processes
#shockt = rshock#
shock
t 1 + µshockt , shock 2 (x,p, s)
where µshockt ⇠ N
 
0, s2shock
 
is normal-distributed exogenous innovation
term.
Figure 3.3: Data for the Estimation of NK-DSGE Model
The data used for output gap xt which is official estimate5 obtained
from BoJ is from 1983Q1 to 2016Q3. The data series of inflation pt is GDP
deflator-based inflation rate from 1980Q3 to 2016Q3. The data series of
shadow rate is from 1999Q1 to 2016Q3. For non-ZLB period from 1983Q1
to 1998Q4, the shadow rate is replaced by the non-ZLB constrained call rate
to complete the full data series of interest rate.
Some structural parameters are calibrated6 as a = 0, b = 0.9975, # = 6
4According to Galı´ (2014, chapter 5), the shock term #pt can be explained as a cost-push
shock which may come from the exogenous variations in desired price markups or exoge-
nous variations in wage markups.
5This series can be downloaded from https://www.boj.or.jp/research/research_
data/gap/index.htm/.
6The elasticity of substitution # is calibrated to be 6whichmeans an average 20%markup
charged by intermediate good firms at steady state. s and h are calibrated at 1 because these
parameters can’t be identified in the estimation. a = 0 means the model economy has the
constant scale to return.
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and s = h = 1. k is a composite of other structural parameters and we
specify its prior distribution as non-informative uniform prior distribution
U(0, 1). The prior and posterior distributions of parameters and standard
deviations are given in Table 3.1. We estimate the NK-DSGE in a DSGE-
VAR7 style to compare the theoretical impulse response from DSGE model
and corresponding empirical impulse response from Bayesian VAR model.
The basic idea of the DSGE-VAR(l) is to use the implied moments of a
DSGE model as the prior distribution for a Bayesian VAR model. When
choosing the prior distribution of a Bayesian VAR model, l is the weight
of this constraint of moments implied by the DSGE model. Following Ad-
jemian et al. (2008), we treat l as a parameter which can be jointly estimated
from the Bayesian estimation of other structural parameters and specify
the prior distribution of l as non-informative uniform prior distribution
U(0, 2). Also, we compare the impulse response and calculate the histori-
cal decomposition to check the contribution of the shadow rate monetary
policy shock to output gap and inflation.
Prior Distribution Posterior Distribution
Parameters Mean St.Dev. Prior Mean St.Dev. 90% HPD Interval
jp 1.5 0.1 G 1.4895 0.1264 [1.2786, 1.6923]
jx 0.375 0.1 G 0.5896 0.1994 [0.2472, 0.9084]
js 0.8 0.1 B 0.8088 0.0341 [0.7557, 0.8669]
rp 0.8 0.1 B 0.4835 0.1393 [0.2694, 0.7190]
rx 0.8 0.1 B 0.7713 0.0800 [0.6460, 0.9060]
rs 0.8 0.1 B 0.4868 0.0989 [0.3250, 0.6457]
µp 0.5 0.5 IG 0.2011 0.0353 [0.1475, 0.2613]
µx 0.5 0.5 IG 0.2057 0.0318 [0.1491, 0.2517]
µs 0.5 0.5 IG 0.1347 0.0160 [0.1096, 0.1611]
Parameters Prior Distribution Mean St.Dev. 90% HPD Interval
k U(0, 1) 0.1920 0.1741 [-0.0039, 0.4726]
l U(0, 2) 0.5174 0.1001 [0.3518, 0.6619]
Table 3.1: Prior and Posterior Distribution of Structural Parameters
The posterior distribution of structural parameters are consistent with
most of related literature on the NK-DSGE estimation with non-ZLB con-
strained policy rate. For example, given posterior mean of k and other
calibrated parameters, we can calculate q as q = 12
⇣
Q pQ2   4
⌘
where
Q = 1+ 1b +
k
b(h+s) . q is the probability that an intermediate good firm can’t
optimize its price in the Calvo (1983) framework. We find that q = 0.7313
7Please refer to Del Negro and Shorfheide (2004), Adjemian et al. (2008), Del negro et al.
(2007) for the technical details of DSGE-VAR model.
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means the duration of price optimization is almost 11 months (3.7 quar-
ters), which is quite reasonable. The multivariate convergence diagnostic
also shows good convergence for all parameters. In Appendix for Chap-
ter 3, as a check of robustness, we also give the estimation results of a
1999Q1-2016Q3 sub-sample. The structural parameters still have reason-
able values and impulse response of monetary policy also shows consistent
dynamics of variables. But if we use the ZLB-constrained call rate for sub-
sample estimation in the same period, we can’t get any reasonable results
because it is impossible for a linear NK-DSGE model, without using non-
linear techniques, to capture the information of monetary policy from the
ZLB-constrained call rate with less dynamics.
3.2.2 Application of NK-DSGEModel with Shadow Rate
Figure 3.4 gives the impulse response of monetary policy shock.
Figure 3.4: DSGE-VAR Impulse Response of Monetary Policy Shock
In Figure 3.4, the blue shaded area represents the 90% Highest Poste-
rior Density Interval (HPDI) of posterior impulse response calculated from
DSGE model. The thick blue line is the medium of posterior impulse re-
sponse of DSGE model. The corresponding impulse response calculated
from Bayesian VAR is also plotted in red dashed lines with 90% HPDI and
the medium of impulse response inside the two red dashed lines. We can
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find the posterior impulse response from DSGEmodel and VARmodel has
the almost same dynamics, similar range and direction, especially for in-
flation and interest rate. For impulse response of output gap to monetary
policy shock, both models show the output gap decreases due to the con-
tractionary monetary policy shock.
Figure 3.5: DSGE-VAR Impulse Response of Supply Shock
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Figure 3.6: DSGE-VAR Impulse Response of Demand Shock
For supply shock, Figure 3.5 shows the consistent impulse response
from both DSGE and VAR models. Figure 3.6 shows the impulse response
triggered by demand shock. Though two kinds of impulse response are
not completely consistent in the range, but the instantaneous response of
each variable to demand shock still has the same direction. The impulse
response analysis from DSGE-VAR model may imply that even if we intro-
duce the shadow rate into estimate a structural DSGE model and estimate
it, the impulse response still can be trusted in the sense that the DSGE-
implied impulse response is similar to the non-structural VARmodel which
is estimated with the same data.
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Figure 3.7: Historical Decomposition of Output Gap
Figure 3.8: Historical Decomposition of Inflation
Figure 3.7 shows the historical decomposition of output gap where the
red area shows the contribution of monetary policy shock. The contribu-
tion of monetary policy shock to the positive improvement of output gap
since 2013Q3 is very obvious. Also, for the bubble economy of Japan from
1985-1990, themonetary policy had contribution of the positive output gap.
The similar pattern can be confirmed in the Figure 3.8 where the monetary
policy shock begun to have positive contribution to inflation since 2013Q3,
but less significant than the contribution to the output gap. Recall the re-
gression results showed by Table 2.4 and Table 2.5 in Section 2.4.3, the mon-
etary policy stance represented by the normalized EMS is more sensitive to
the output gap than to the inflation. This result is same in the historical
decomposition of DSGE analysis.
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3.3 Shadow Rate in TVP-SV VARModel
Following Nakajima (2011) and Primiceri (2005), Del Nergo and Primiceri
(2015)8, we estimate a TVP-SV VARmodel with 3 lags to check the impulse
response of monetary policy shock at different time points. The dataset
used here has 3 variables, output gap, inflation and short interest rate that
are same as the data used in the estimation of DSGE-VAR model in Section
3.2.1. From Figure 3.9 and Figure 3.10, 1% increase in short interest rate
leads to the decreasing of output gap and inflation. Time-varying impulse
response shows that the decreasing of output gap in the period of 2007-
2009, the global financial crisis, is more serious than other periods. The
time-varying nature of the parameters capture the structure of economy
very accurately.
Figure 3.9: Impulse Response of Output Gap to Monetary Policy Shock
8Del Nergo and Primiceri (2015) corrects the misspecification of estimation algorithm in
Primiceri (2005).
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Figure 3.10: Impulse Response of Inflation to Monetary Policy Shock
Figure 3.10 shows the impulse response of inflation to monetary policy
shock. Increasing of short interest rate leads to the decreasing of inflation.
This is the standard result in such literature of monetary policy analysis
with VAR models.
Figure 3.11: Impulse Response of Interest Rate to Monetary Policy Shock
Figure 3.12 shows the stochastic volatility of each structural shock. Note
that the second peak in the structural shock of inflation comes from the
increasing of consumption tax.
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Figure 3.12: Time-Varying Stochastic Volatility of Structural Shock
From Section 3.3, we can find that the shadow rate can be used in non-
structural VAR models. But we can’t use the ZLB-constrained short pol-
icy rate in the similar exercise because data of ZLB-constrained is near zero
without dynamics fromwhere we can get the information of monetary pol-
icy stance. This is biggest advantage of using shadow rate as a measure of
monetary policy in the econometric analysis.
3.4 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we adopt the shadow rate as a measure of monetary policy
of BoJ because since 1999Q1 when the general policy rate of BoJ, call rate,
has kept been near zero and already lost its function as a operating target
for the conduct of monetary policy. The concept of shadow rate is not new,
but for a long time, it is not widely used in macroeconomics. Since the
ZLB has become a common issue for monetary authorities in the advanced
economies, using the shadow rate to observe and analyze the monetary
policy has been applied in many empirical works. We also confirmed that
the shadow rate does have credible traceability of the BoJ’s policy in the
ZLB environment, providing us a new perspective to check the unconven-
tional monetary policy of BoJ. Most of existing literatures use the shadow
rate in reduced-form time series econometric models such as FAVARmodel
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or TVP-VARmodel to find the empirical evidences of unconventional mon-
etary policy, but these models are not structural. The introduction of the
shadow rate into the DSGE framework is a new attempt. Using the shadow
rate does relieve us from the technical difficulties incurred by the ZLB, but
whether this method is robust or not is still unclear. But at least, the struc-
tural parameters from the full-sample estimation have reasonable values,
which is also true for the sub-sample estimation. Impulse response of mon-
etary policy shock also shows consistent dynamics of macroeconomic vari-
ables. As far as we know, there doesn’t exist other similar works that use
the shadow rate in the estimation of DSGE model. However, the historical
decomposition of output gap and inflation advocates the effectiveness of
the monetary easing conducted by BoJ. The equivalence between shadow
rate and the monetary easing policy which are assumed in this chapter are
based on the empirical findings and these empirical evidences have been
mapped into the DSGE model. Than we find that the impulse response
functions of NK-DSGE model are similar to VAR model as its empirical
counterpart in a DSGE-VAR framework. TVP-SV VARmodel in Section 3.3
also proves the application of shadow rate in such kind of non-structural
model is appropriate and quite robust.
For further research, we want to introduce the shadow rate to a Smets
and Wouters (2003, 2007) type medium-scale DSGE model with more dy-
namics than the simple NK-DSGE model used in this chapter. Smets and
Wouters (2003, 2007) type medium-scale DSGE model is the prototype of
the DSGE models used in major central banks. If we can show that the
shadow rate can be used in such medium-scale DSGE model, the shadow
rate will be more valuable because how to deal with the ZLB-constrained
short policy rate is the most difficult part in the DSGE estimation. If we can
replace the ZLB-constrained short policy rate by the negative shadow rate
and still get reasonable estimation of structural parameters and empirical
results, the ZLB constraint will no longer be a problem. Also we shouldn’t
forget that the shadow rate only exists as a economic concept and the cen-
tral bank can’t control the shadow rate as a operating target, but we can use
the information from it as a guidance for monetary policy operation.
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Chapter 4
Estimation of Medium-Scale DSGEModel with
Shadow Rate
4.1 Introduction
In recent years, since the nominal policy rates in major economies have
been constraint by the ZLB and the policy regime has been changed from
conventional monetary policy to unconventional monetary policy, how to
evaluate the effects of unconventional monetary policy in the ZLB envi-
ronment has been very important for macroeconomic research. Due to the
difficulty and unreliability incurred by the nonlinearity of ZLB in linear so-
lution and estimation techniques of DSGE models, researchers have made
various types of attempts. One approach is to take the ZLB constraint ex-
plicitly by nonlinear techniques, but dealing with the ZLB by nonlinear
techniques is much more demanding than widely-used linear techniques
(Ferna´ndez-Villaverde (2015), Del Negro et al. (2015), Linde´ et al (2016),
Aruoba et al. (2017), Gust et al. (2017)), especially for medium-scale mod-
els. Another approach is to make some kind of compromise to allow a
shortcut by abstracting from the ZLB or to assume that there doesn’t ex-
ist significant structural break before and after the ZLB becomes binding
(Benati (2008), Ireland (2011), Chen et al. (2012)).
Even in the real world, the short nominal interest rates are constrained
by the ZLB and not allowed to be negative, many recent empirical works
(Bullard (2012), Kim and Singleton (2012), Bauer and Rudebusch (2016),
Christensen and Rudebusch (2014, 2016), Lombardi and Zhu (2014), Kripp-
ner (2015), Wu and Xia (2016)) use the shadow rate as a consistent and
compatible measure of monetary policy stance to quantify the effects of
unconventional monetary policy. The concept of shadow rate as a tractable
method to account for the ZLB is proposed by Black (1995). The shadow
rate estimated from shadow rate term structure model can take positive
values that are same as the short nominal interest rates in non-ZLB period,
but negative values in the ZLB environment when the short nominal inter-
est rates are static and near zero.
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Compared with the many empirical literatures, because the shadow
rate is estimated from the reduced-form factor models that use two or three
factors to fit the yield curve, it is difficult to incorporate the shadow rate
into structural models in a structurally consistent fashion, there are few
applications of the shadow rate in structural macroeconomic models. Wu
and Zhang (2016) documented the strong empirical relationship between
the shadow rate and unconventional monetary policy (quantitative eas-
ing and lending facilities) in the case of the United States. They also pro-
vide a theoretical foundation to introduce the shadow rate into the struc-
tural macroeconomic models. The counterintuitive puzzles such as large
government spending multiplier and stimulative effect of negative sup-
ply shock in DSGE models with the presence of the ZLB also disappear
in their framework. In Chapter 3 we confirmed similar empirical relation-
ship in the case of Japan and also confirmed positive effects of unconven-
tional monetary policy conducted by BoJ in a small-scale NK-DSGE model
estimated by using Japan’s output gap, inflation and shadow rate. Con-
sidering that the small-scale NK-DSGE model is highly stylized and has
less dynamics than widely-used medium-scale DSGE model, we estimate
a medium-scale NK-DSGE model to check the reliability of shadow rate’s
application in the estimation of DSGE models by comparing the structural
parameters and model dynamics implied by estimated models with a pre-
ZLB sub-sample (1980Q1-1998Q4) and a full-sample (1980Q1-2016Q3). We
also conduct counterfactual simulation exercises to see the macroeconomic
effects of unconventional monetary policy.
The remaining of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2, we
specify a medium-scale NK-DSGE model. In Section 4.3, we compare the
results in pre-ZLB sub-sample estimation and full-sample estimation. For
the full-sample estimation, the data for nominal interest rate from 1999Q1
to 2016Q3 is replaced by the shadow rate that is estimated in Chapter 2. In
Section 4.4, we follow the simulation methodology designed by Sarah and
Jean-Guillaume (2016) to generate the path of macroeconomic variables in
the absence of unconventional monetary policy. Finally, Section 4.5 con-
cludes this chapter and gives the prospect for further research.
4.2 A Medium-Scale DSGEModel
According to the equivalence between the shadow rate and quantitative
easing (QE) showed byWu and Zhang (2016), there are two key points that
we need to confirm if we want to introduce the shadow rate into DSGE
models through the New Keynesian IS curve based on the theoretical foun-
dation proposed by Wu and Zhang (2016).
1. The shadow rate has high correlation with QE variables such as the
balance sheet of central bank.
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2. The QE variables have high correlation with credit spread between
risky assets such as corporate bond and safe assets such as govern-
ment bond.
These empirical evidences are already confirmed by Figure 2.8, Figure 2.9
in Section 2.4.1 and Figure 3.1, Figure 3.2 in Section 3.2. Based on these
empirical foundation, we proceed to build the medium-scale DSGE model.
The seminalmedium-scale NK-DSGEmodels constructed by Christiano
et al. (2005) and Smets andWouters (2003, 2007) are the benchmark models
used by the central banks for policy analysis and macroeconomic forecast.
In this section, we build a medium-scale NK-DSGE model with features
such as monopolistic competition, Calvo (1983) type price and wage rigid-
ity, variable capital utilization, consumption habit formation. Additionally,
stochastic balanced growth trend
logZt = log z+ logZt 1 + #zt
is introduced into the model to improve the data fit of long run economic growth
and short run business cycles simultaneously. We define the gross growth rate of
technology level as
log
Zt
Zt 1
= log zt = log z+ #zt
where #zt is an exogenous technology shock process. We can rewrite this as zt =
ze#zt . From this result, we can find that at the steady state, the balanced growth rate
in model economy is z. Under this specification, we don’t need to isolate the trend
and cycles of macroeconomic data, avoiding information loss due to the filtering
of raw data.
4.2.1 Household
The representative household exists continuously in interval h 2 [0, 1] where h is
an index. The utility function is additively separable. The representative house-
hold derives utility from consumption Ct,h  qCt 1,h and disutility from labor sup-
ply Lt,h, where q is the degree of habit formation. Structural parameters b, s and
c represent the discount factor, risk aversion and the inverse of labor supply elas-
ticity respectively. #bt and #
l
t are a preference shock and a labor supply shock re-
spectively, which affects the household’s consumption demand and labor supply
exogenously. Z1 st multiplied on labor disutility e#
l
t
L1+ct
1+c is to satisfy the balanced
growth path of model economy1 .
Et
•
Â
t=0
bte#
b
t
24 (Ct.h   qCt 1,h)1 s
1  s   e
#lt
Z1 st L
1+c
t,h
1+ c
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1Please refer to Erceg et al. (2006) for the specification of utility function in DSGEmodels
with balanced growth path. For the conditions of balanced growth path in macroeconomic
models, please refer to King et al. (1988).
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The budget constraint of the representative household is given as
Ct,h + It,h +
Bt,h
Pt
=
RNt 1Bt 1,h
Pt
+ RKt Ut,hKt 1,h +WtLt,h +
Tt,h
Pt
where Pt is general price level in the model economy. RKt andWt are competitive
factor prices, capital rental and wage respectively. The representative household
purchases one-period maturity government bond Bt,h which has a nominal gross
return RNt and receives a transfer Tt,h. The capital accumulation law is
Kt,h = [1  d (Ut,h)]Kt 1,h +
"
1  G
 
It,h
It 1,h
e#it
z
!#
It,h (4.1)
where G
✓
It,h
It 1,h
e#
i
t
z
◆
= 12z
✓
It,h
It 1,h
e#
i
t
z   1
◆2
is a convex function of investment ad-
justment cost. Capital utilization Ut,h is assumed to be variable which satisfies
d
0
(·) > 0, d”(·) > 0. At the steady state, d(U = 1) = d 2 (0, 1) and we de-
fine µ = d0(U = 1)/d”(U = 1) as a steady state parameter. #it is an investment
adjustment cost shock that affects the investment installation cost and then in-
vestment decision. The representative household optimizes life utility subject to
budget constraint and capital accumulation law by deciding Ct 1,h, Ct,h, Bt,h, Ut,h,
Kt,h and It,h. Since all households are identical and make same optimal decisions,
we can drop index h to aggregate the variables due to the symmetric equilibrium.
The equilibrium conditions are given as follows.
Lt = e#
b
t (Ct   qCt 1) s   bqEte#bt+1 (Ct+1   Ct) s (4.2)
Lt = bEtLt+1
RNt
Pt+1
(4.3)
RKt =
LKt
Lt
d
0
(Ut) = Qtd
0
(Ut) (4.4)
Qt = bEt
Lt+1
Lt
h
RKt Ut+1 +Qt+1(1  d(Ut+1))
i
(4.5)
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(4.6)
Lt and LKt are the Lagrange multipliers associated with budget constraint and
capital accumulation law respectively. The Tobin’s Q can be defined as Qt =
LKt /Lt which represents real capital price measured by household’s consumption
marginal utility. Pt+1 = Pt+1/Pt is the gross inflation rate from period t to t+ 1.
Households provide heterogenous kinds of labor to intermediate good firms. The
wage rigidity is introduced according to Erceg et al. (2000). An intermediate good
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firm f aggregate the heterogenous kinds of labor Lt,( f ,h) to homogenous labor Lt, f
by a Dixit-Sriglitz production technology
Lt, f =
 Z 1
0
L
1
1+lwt
t,( f ,h)dh
!1+lwt
where lwt is the wage markup of heterogenous labors, which has a relationship
lwt =
1
qwt  1 with elasticity of substitute of heterogenous labors q
w
t . Intermediate
good firm minimizes the cost of labor inputs
R 1
0 Lt,( f ,h)Wt,( f ,h)dh subject to its la-
bor aggregate technology. Since all intermediate good firms are assumed to make
same optimal decision, so the index of intermediate good firm f can be omitted
here. The first order conditions are
Wt =
 Z 1
0
W
  1
lwt
t,h dh
! lwt
Lt,h =
✓
Wt,h
Wt
◆  1+lwt
lwt Lt
whereWt is the aggregate level wage. For each period, 1  xw fraction of all house-
holds can optimize their wage Wt,h. xw fraction of all households can’t optimize
the wage and just index the wage according to
Pt+jWt+j,h = zP
gw
t+j 1P
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where P is the gross inflation rate at steady state and gw is the wage indexation
weight on the gross inflation rate of previous period. Note that zj means that the
wage will increase at each period with a growth rate z from period t to period
t+ j. The representative household has a probability 1  xw to set optimal wage
to maximize the lifetime utility at each period. So the optimization problem is
max Et
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t+j,h represents the disutility from labor supply.
The first order condition is
Et
•
Â
j=0
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
(bxw)
j Lt+jLt+j
lwt+j
"
zjW⇤t
Wt+j
" j
’
k=1
✓
Pt+k 1
P
◆gw P
Pt+k
##  1
lwt+j
 1
⇥
266666664
zjW⇤t
" j
’
k=1
✓
Pt+k 1
P
◆gw P
Pt+k
#
 
⇣
1+ lwt+j
⌘ e#bt+j+#lt+j Z1 st+j
Lt+j
⇥
264Lt+j
"
zjW⇤t
Wt+j
" j
’
k=1
✓
Pt+k 1
P
◆gw P
Pt+k
##  1
lwt+j
 1
375
c
377777775
9>>>>>>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>>>>>>;
= 0 (4.7)
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whereW⇤t is the optimal wage set by the household. The aggregate level of wageWt is the
result of all households’ optimization.
Wt =
24(1  xw) (W⇤t )  1lwt + xw (1  xw) W⇤t 1z✓Pt 1P
◆gw P
Pt
   1
lwt
+ . . .
35 lwt )
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  1
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j
w
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##  1
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375 (4.8)
Log linearization of (4.7) and (4.8) leads to a wage version of Hybrid New Keynesian
Phillips Curve (NKPC) which describes the dynamics of inflation and wage. The time-
variant wage markup lwt and labor supply shock #
l
t will become unidentified after log-
linearization and be redefined as a wage shock #wt .
4.2.2 Intermediate Good Firms and Final Good Firms
Final good firm has a Dixit-Stiglitz production technology
Yt =
 Z 1
0
Y
1
1+lpt
t, f d f
!1+lpt
where lpt is the price markup of intermediate good, which has a relationship
l
p
t =
1
q
p
t  1
with elasticity of substitute of intermediate good qpt . Final good firm
minimizes the cost of intermediate good inputs
R 1
0 Yt, f Pt, f d f subject to its produc-
tion technology. The cost minimization leads to the general price level Pt and the
demand curve of intermediate good Yt, f .
Pt =
 
P
  1
l
p
t
t, f d f
! lpt
Yt, f =
✓Pt, f
Pt
◆  1+lpt
l
p
t Yt
The price setting of intermediate good firm is according to Calvo (1983) mecha-
nism. For each period, 1  xp fraction of all intermediate good firms can optimize
their price Pt, f . xp fraction of all intermediate good firms can’t optimize the price
and just index the price according to
Pt+j, f = Pt+j 1, fP
gp
t+j 1P
1 gp = Pt, f
"
j
’
k=1
✓
Pt+k 1
P
◆gp
P
#
where gp is the price indexation weight on the gross inflation rate of previous
period. The intermediate good firm has a Cobb-Douglas production function
Yt, f =
⇣
ZtLt, f
⌘1 a ⇣
Ut, f Kt 1, f
⌘a   jZt
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where j is fixed cost in intermediate good production. Cost minimization of
intermediate good firm minWtLt, f + RKt Ut, f Kt 1, f leads to the marginal cost and
the optimal factor input ratio. Since the optimal decision is identical among all
intermediate good firms, we can drop the index of intermediate good firm f .
MCt =

Wt
(1  a)Zt
 1 a ✓RKt
a
◆a
(4.9)
UtKt 1
Lt
=
aWt
(1  a)RKt
(4.10)
Using the demand curve of intermediate good Yt, f derived previously to aggre-
gating the production function of all intermediate good firms leads to aggregate
production function
YtQt = (ZtLt)1 a (UtKt 1)a   jZt (4.11)
where Qt =
R 1
0
⇣ Pt, f
Pt
⌘  1+lpt
l
p
t d f is the price dispersion. Since all intermediate good
firms choose same optimal price, Qt is approximately equal to unit at steady state.
Intermediate good firm optimizes Pt, f to maximizes discounted present value of
profit.
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The FOC of this optimization is given as
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where P⇤t is the optimal price decided by the intermediate good firm. Aggregating the
price of all intermediate goods leads to the law of motion of general price level.
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Log linearization of (4.12) and (4.13) leads to a Hybrid NKPCwhich describes the dynamics
of inflation.
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4.2.3 Monetary Authority
We assume that the monetary authority follows a Taylor Rule by gradually adjusting the
nominal interest rate in response to inflation, and output gap.
log
RNt
RN
= jr log
RNt 1
RN
+ (1  jr)
"
jp
 
1
4
3
Â
j=0
log
Pt j
P
!
+ jy log
Yt
Y⇤t
#
+ #rt (4.14)
jr is interest rate smoothing parameter of Taylor Rule. jp and jy are the param-
eters which represent the response degree of shadow rate to inflation and output
gap respectively. #rt is a monetary policy shock. Y
⇤
t is the potential output when
price dispersion Qt is unit and capital utilization Ut is 100% at steady state.
Y⇤t = (ZtLt)1 a(Kt 1)a   jZt (4.15)
For the steady state, de-trending and log-linearization of model, please refer Ap-
pendix. In the estimation of model, we replace the data of nominal interest rate
with the shadow rate data after the ZLB becomes binding. Note that the shadow
rate is not the operation target of the central bank, but it is a good summary statis-
tic of monetary policy in both ZLB and non-ZLB environment. The usefulness of
the shadow rate has been proved in many empirical applications. The theoretical
foundation established by Wu and Zhang (2016) shows that the impact of uncon-
ventional policy (quantitative easing and lending facilities) is identical to that of a
negative shadow rate that enters directly into the New Keynesian IS curve. This
validates our approach to introduce the shadow rate into a medium-scale model.
4.2.4 Market Equilibrium and Exogenous Shocks
Aggregate resource constraint is given as
Yt = Ct + It + gZte#
g
t (4.16)
where gZte#
g
t represents the government expenditure. #gt is the government expen-
diture shock. g is a scale parameter which can be calibrated from the data. In this
model, we have 7 exogenous shocks which all follow first-order autoregression
processes.
#xt = rx#
x
t 1 + µxt , x 2 (b, i, g, p,w, r, z) (4.17)
#
p
t is a cost-push shock process which comes from the time-variant price markup
of intermediate good lpt . This shock appears in NKPC. Regarding the dynamic
properties of the technology shock #zt and monetary policy shock #
r
t, these two
shocks are assumed to be I.I.D processes which means rr = rz = 0. µxt is an
I.I.D innovation term which follows standard nominal distribution N(0, s2x). The
log-linearized version of model is given in Appendix.
4.3 Estimation and Model Properties
The variables defined inmodel and the actual observed data can be linked through
the observation equations. Data used for estimation is same as Ueda and Sudo
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(2008) and Hirose and Kurozumi (2012) in the estimation of medium-scale DSGE
of Japan economy. The data of nominal interest rate from 1999Q1 to 2016Q3 is
replaced by the shadow rate estimated previously in full-sample estimation.2666666664
100D logGDPt
100D logCt
100D log It
100D logWt
Lt
100D logDEFt
RNt
3777777775
=
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z⇤
z⇤
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z⇤
L⇤
p⇤
r⇤ + p⇤
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+
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byt   byt 1 + #ztbct   bct 1 + #ztbit  bit 1 + #ztbwt   bwt 1 + #ztbLt
ptbRNt
3777777775
z⇤ = 100 log z, r⇤ = 100 logR, p⇤ = 100 logP are the state steady of the labor, the
net balance growth rate, net real interest rate and net inflation rate respectively.
For the choice of prior distribution, we follow the similar research that focuses on
the Bayesian estimation of a medium-scale DSGE model for Japan economy, such
as Ueda and Sudo (2008) and Hirose and Kurozumi (2012). Price markup lp and
wage markup lw are calibrated to be 0.2 and 0.15 respectively. Capital deprecia-
tion rate d is calibrated to be 0.15. Capital share a and government expenditure
ratio g are calibrated to be 0.37 and 0.31.
Figure 4.1: Data for Estimation of Medium-Scale DSGE Model
Figure 4.1 shows the data used for estimation. The shaded area in Figure 4 in-
dicates 1999Q1 when the ZLB became binding. The call rate is near zero and static
since 1999Q1, from which we can’t get too much information about the stance of
monetary policy. But the shadow rate from 1999Q1 still keeps decreasing to show
the simulative stance of monetary policy conducted by BoJ. We firstly ran the esti-
mation with a sub-sample 1980Q1-1998Q4 because the call rate (policy rate of BoJ)
decreased to 0.0375% in 1999Q1 and the effect of ZLB on policy rate emerged since
then. Then we ran the estimation of full-sample 1980Q1-2016Q3 with shadow rate
from 1999Q1 to 2016Q3. Prior distribution and results of posterior distribution are
given in Table 4.1.
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Prior Distribution
Posterior Distribution Posterior Distribution
estimation with call rate estimation with shadow rate
1980Q1-1998Q4 1980Q1-2016Q3
Parameter Distribution Mean Std Mean 5% 95% Std Mean 5% 95% Std
s G 1.000 0.375 2.091 1.539 2.611 0.329 2.065 1.724 2.413 0.212
q B 0.700 0.150 0.341 0.231 0.453 0.067 0.333 0.253 0.413 0.049
c G 2.000 0.750 3.062 1.639 4.362 0.862 4.423 2.893 5.956 0.945
1/z G 4.000 1.500 6.081 2.959 8.913 1.851 10.215 6.422 13.851 2.284
µ G 1.000 1.000 0.755 0.051 1.432 0.513 0.551 0.153 0.931 0.249
j/y B 0.075 0.013 0.067 0.048 0.086 0.012 0.066 0.047 0.085 0.012
gp B 0.500 0.250 0.300 0.006 0.574 0.192 0.191 0.006 0.361 0.124
xp B 0.375 0.100 0.646 0.573 0.717 0.044 0.725 0.673 0.775 0.031
gw B 0.500 0.250 0.706 0.465 0.981 0.168 0.674 0.441 0.940 0.154
xw B 0.375 0.100 0.497 0.377 0.617 0.074 0.513 0.421 0.610 0.057
jr B 0.800 0.100 0.776 0.724 0.829 0.032 0.857 0.831 0.883 0.016
jp G 1.700 0.100 1.705 1.560 1.846 0.088 1.812 1.664 1.963 0.091
jy G 0.125 0.050 0.034 0.012 0.055 0.014 0.037 0.018 0.055 0.012
p⇤ G 0.400 0.050 0.398 0.319 0.477 0.048 0.320 0.234 0.406 0.053
z⇤ G 0.200 0.050 0.161 0.098 0.223 0.038 0.117 0.072 0.162 0.028
r⇤ G 0.500 0.050 0.600 0.517 0.682 0.050 0.383 0.276 0.483 0.063
L⇤ N 0.000 0.050 -0.002 -0.085 0.081 0.050 0.000 -0.082 0.085 0.050
rb B 0.500 0.200 0.899 0.833 0.970 0.044 0.942 0.900 0.987 0.029
ri B 0.500 0.200 0.568 0.376 0.748 0.115 0.342 0.165 0.513 0.106
rw B 0.500 0.200 0.116 0.014 0.216 0.070 0.053 0.007 0.100 0.032
rg B 0.500 0.200 0.968 0.946 0.990 0.015 0.976 0.965 0.988 0.007
rp B 0.500 0.200 0.951 0.913 0.989 0.026 0.935 0.902 0.971 0.023
µb IG 0.500 inf 3.532 2.424 4.643 0.694 3.726 2.648 4.777 0.703
µi IG 0.500 inf 4.930 3.547 6.333 0.993 3.808 3.208 4.383 0.393
µw IG 0.500 inf 0.798 0.662 0.934 0.084 0.863 0.760 0.959 0.061
µg IG 0.500 inf 2.261 1.901 2.592 0.212 2.581 2.283 2.861 0.178
µp IG 0.500 inf 0.354 0.201 0.516 0.105 0.241 0.165 0.315 0.051
µr IG 0.500 inf 0.188 0.159 0.215 0.017 0.176 0.156 0.195 0.012
µz IG 0.500 inf 1.967 1.698 2.238 0.167 1.898 1.704 2.092 0.118
Table 4.1: Estimation Results of Structural Parameters
For most of the parameters, the posterior distributions of the full-sample es-
timation with the shadow rate data are still very reasonable and similar to the
corresponding posterior distribution obtained from the estimation with pre-ZLB
sub-sample. This may suggest that a DSGE model can be still applied in the ZLB
environment by estimating the model with shadow rate. The posterior distribu-
tion of some structural parameters, for instance, the probability that an intermedi-
ate good firm is not allowed to optimize its price is xp ⇡ 0.725, which implies av-
erage duration of price contracts of about 11 months. For the probability of Calvo
(1983) type wage contract, xw ⇡ 0.497 in pre-ZLB estimation and xw ⇡ 0.513 in
full-sample estimation with shadow rate means the rigidity of nominal wage has
increased since ZLB period, but still in a reasonable range. Monetary policy pa-
rameters (jr, jp , jy) don’t have significant changes in both groups of estimation.
Other parameters are consistent with the most of medium-scale DSGE literature.
We than compare the dynamic properties implied by both estimated models. Ta-
ble 4.2 gives the variance decomposition of 7 observable variables calculated with
the posterior distributions obtained from two groups of estimation.
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Variance Decomposition at T = 8 µbt µit µ
g
t µ
w
t µ
p
t µ
z
t µ
r
t
GDP 3.68% 3.89% 23.15% 25.67% 9.87% 13.85% 0.56% 0.33% 7.39% 7.39% 54.93% 49.49% 0.42% 0.80%
consumption 34.64% 36.54% 2.89% 1.64% 3.69% 7.70% 0.73% 0.52% 5.65% 5.65% 51.19% 45.27% 1.22% 2.71%
investment 3.35% 3.44% 77.21% 81.48% 0.80% 1.10% 0.54% 0.29% 10.16% 10.16% 7.77% 5.61% 0.17% 0.28%
wage 1.05% 0.94% 0.75% 0.84% 0.04% 0.05% 24.18% 32.01% 44.69% 44.69% 29.25% 21.13% 0.05% 0.11%
labor 3.16% 2.86% 28.68% 27.09% 7.60% 11.98% 4.78% 4.17% 36.74% 36.74% 18.15% 13.28% 0.89% 2.33%
inflation 7.54% 7.76% 16.50% 10.08% 0.81% 1.33% 6.53% 5.06% 50.59% 50.59% 15.42% 9.94% 2.59% 5.73%
interest rate 9.34% 9.03% 28.19% 15.72% 1.52% 2.36% 4.26% 3.29% 34.85% 34.85% 8.49% 5.13% 13.35% 23.80%
Variance Decomposition at T = 32 µbt µit µ
g
t µ
w
t µ
p
t µ
z
t µ
r
t
GDP 3.70% 3.93% 23.44% 25.63% 9.78% 13.74% 0.61% 0.37% 7.82% 6.60% 54.24% 48.93% 0.41% 0.80%
consumption 34.91% 36.82% 3.41% 1.96% 3.65% 7.60% 0.73% 0.54% 5.71% 5.92% 50.38% 44.50% 1.20% 2.66%
investment 3.92% 3.84% 76.24% 80.11% 0.82% 1.12% 0.61% 0.35% 10.81% 8.84% 7.43% 5.44% 0.16% 0.29%
wage 1.27% 1.21% 0.78% 0.88% 0.06% 0.09% 23.54% 30.67% 45.68% 46.55% 28.62% 20.47% 0.05% 0.12%
labor 4.99% 7.18% 21.41% 19.84% 9.30% 13.68% 3.60% 3.26% 34.60% 34.99% 25.44% 19.34% 0.65% 1.70%
inflation 7.44% 7.80% 15.87% 9.67% 0.87% 1.37% 6.26% 4.78% 48.47% 56.60% 18.63% 14.46% 2.47% 5.32%
interest rate 10.14% 13.01% 30.25% 16.79% 1.89% 3.40% 3.47% 2.59% 28.70% 32.74% 14.81% 13.88% 10.74% 17.59%
Variance Decomposition at T = • µbt µit µ
g
t µ
w
t µ
p
t µ
z
t µ
r
t
GDP 3.70% 3.94% 23.43% 25.62% 9.78% 13.74% 0.61% 0.37% 7.85% 6.61% 54.22% 48.92% 0.41% 0.80%
consumption 34.88% 36.82% 3.41% 1.95% 3.66% 7.61% 0.73% 0.54% 5.71% 5.91% 50.40% 44.50% 1.19% 2.66%
investment 3.93% 3.93% 76.16% 79.97% 0.85% 1.17% 0.61% 0.35% 10.86% 8.86% 7.43% 5.43% 0.16% 0.29%
wage 1.27% 1.22% 0.78% 0.88% 0.07% 0.10% 23.44% 30.56% 45.83% 46.65% 28.56% 20.47% 0.04% 0.12%
labor 5.20% 7.26% 18.23% 16.50% 11.78% 18.35% 3.00% 2.69% 29.42% 29.08% 31.82% 24.72% 0.54% 1.40%
inflation 7.45% 8.53% 15.13% 8.97% 1.58% 3.02% 5.90% 4.38% 46.31% 52.14% 21.31% 18.09% 2.32% 4.87%
interest rate 9.77% 13.46% 26.58% 13.25% 3.54% 7.68% 3.02% 2.01% 25.98% 25.89% 21.84% 24.19% 9.27% 13.52%
Table 4.2: Variance Decomposition of 7 Observable Variables
The first column of each shock’s variance decomposition is from the pre-ZLB sub-sample
estimation. The second column of each shock’s variance decomposition is from the full-
sample estimation with shadow rate.
For the variance decomposition of GDP, except monetary policy shock, other
structural shocks have similar explanatory power. The full-sample estimationwith
the shadow rate shows 2 times stronger explanatory power than the pre-ZLB es-
timation. For most periods after 1999Q1, call rate is static and near zero, but the
impact of monetary policy on macroeconomic variables can be still confirmed by
using the shadow rate.
Figure 4.2: Impulse Response of Interest Rate on Monetary Policy Shock
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Figure 4.3: Impulse Response of Observable Variables on Monetary Policy
Shock
Figure 4.2 gives the impulse response of interest rate onmonetary policy shock
calculated from posterior mean of three groups of estimation. We omit the credit
interval because the 95% band is very thin. Two lines are very close and we can
find that the dynamics of impulse response implied by both groups of estimation
don’t have too much difference, quantitatively and qualitatively. Figure 4.3 shows
that a positive monetary policy shock has similar mechanism even we use the
shadow rate to estimate the model. But the impulse response calculated from the
posterior mean of estimation with shadow rate is quantitatively more significant
than another groups of estimation. This may imply the monetary policy stance of
unconventional policies is more aggressive.
4.4 Counterfactual Simulation
This section presents the quantitative evaluation of unconventional monetary pol-
icy of BoJ since 1999Q1 from the view of counterfactual simulation. We follow the
simulation methodology designed by Sarah and Jean-Guillaume (2016).
1. Identification of actual structural shocks with unconventional monetary
policy implied by shadow rate: We firstly take the posterior mean estimates
of structural parameters obtained from full-sample estimation with shadow
rate and compute the structural shocks {µbt , µzt , µit, µgt , µwt , µpt , µrt} by Kalman
filter. These shocks are the realizations from all monetary policy decisions
(”observed”).
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2. Identification of counterfactual structural shocks with conventional mon-
etary policy implied by ZLB-constrained call rate: We then re-estimate the
standard deviation of monetary policy shock µrt by replacing the shadow
rate by the usual call rate, all other structural parameters are calibrated to
be their values obtained in the previous step 1. These shocks are those re-
alizations that come from the conventional part of monetary policy (”coun-
terfactual”).
3. Simulation: We then compute the simulated time series of variables from
the estimatedmodel using the first and second set ofmonetary policy shocks,
given other structural shocks obtained in step 1.
We explain the procedure of counterfactual simulation in more details.
1. Estimation with shadow rate full-sample dataset.
• smoothed structural shocks {µbt , µit, µgt , µwt , µpt , µzt , µr,shadow ratet }Tt=1
• posterior distribution of parameters
2. Estimation of standard error of monetary policy shock with call rate full-
sample dataset given other parameters fixed at the posterior mean obtained
in step 1.
• smoothed structural shocks {µbt , µit, µgt , µwt , µpt , µzt , µr,call ratet }Tt=1
3. Setup of two groups of structural shocks.
• ”observed” structural shocks {µbt , µit, µgt , µwt , µpt , µzt , µr,shadow ratet }Tt=1
• ”counterfactual” structural shocks {µbt , µit, µgt , µwt , µpt , µzt , µr,call ratet }Tt=1
4. Calibration of model given the structural parameters in step 1.
5. Simulation of calibrated model in step 4 given same initial condition and
two groups of shocks as exogenous driven force.
• ”observed” endogenous variables
• ”counterfactual” endogenous variables
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Figure 4.4: Smoothed Structural Shocks
Figure 4.5: Identified Monetary Policy Shock
As shown in Figure 4.4, except themonetary policy shock, other 6 structural shocks
identified in the step 1 and step 2 have almost same paths. Figure 4.5 shows the
monetary policy shocks identified from the shadow rate and call rate. We use ”ob-
served” to mean the monetary policy shock identified from the estimation using
the shadow rate because we consider the shadow rate can accurately represent
the stance of monetary policy, but call rate constrained by the ZLB can’t given the
information about the monetary policy stance. Since 1999Q1, the estimated mon-
etary policy shocks are negative in most periods. Even though these shocks can’t
change the observed call rate but it can represent a commitment to expansionary
monetary policy stance. The unconventional monetary policy shock can affect the
future expectation of interest rate and then the whole yield curve, then affect the
real economy. The monetary policy shocks identified here are very similar to those
of Aoki and Ueno (2012) with another approach.
Figure 4.6 shows the simulated paths of selected model variables. The blue
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line in each subplot means the simulated path of counterfactual monetary policy
shock, given other structural shocks fixed. Counterfactual simulated paths for byt,bct and bit are all below their actual ”observed” realizations. Without the implemen-
tation of unconventional monetary policy from 1999Q1, Japan economy would
have experienced poorer performance. The policy impact on labor bLt, investmentbit and capital price bQt is especially obvious. The policy impact on inflation is
also significant, which implies that unconventional monetary policy seems to have
some effect on the resolution of deflation.
Figure 4.6: Simulated Percentage Deviation Path of Macroeconomic Vari-
ables
Note that the simulated paths given in the Figure 4.6 are the paths of model
variables, whichmeans that these variables are the percentage deviation from their
steady states. To get a better visualization of counterfactual simulation, we nor-
malize the values of main macroeconomic real variables at 1998Q1 as 100 and use
the observation equation to reconstruct the level paths of GDP, consumption, in-
vestment, wage.
64
Figure 4.7: Simulated Level Path of Macroeconomic Variables
Macroeconomic variable GDP consumption investment wage
Relative cumulative loss 25.80 27.67 53.17 15.79
Table 4.3: Relative Cumulative Loss from 1999Q1 to 2016Q3
The cumulative loss associated with the variable xt is Â
⇣
xot
xct
  1
⌘
⇥ 100, where xot
is the observed level and xct is the counterfactual level.
Based on the level paths of real macroeconomic variables, we can calculate
relative cumulative loss taken back by the implementation of the unconventional
monetary policy since 1999Q1. Without the implementation of the unconventional
monetary policy since 1999Q1, macroeconomic variables would suffered lost rel-
atively compared to their actual realizations, especially for investment. Figure
4.8, 4.9, 4.10, 4.11, 4.12, 4.13 give the historical decomposition of observable GDP
growth rate, consumption growth rate and investment growth rate from 1999Q1
to 2016Q3. For most of periods, the monetary policy shock has made positive con-
tribution to these variables. Figure 14 gives the historical decomposition of capital
price bQt, the monetary policy shock has very obvious contribution on the capital
price. Figure 4.12 shows the historical decomposition of labor from which we can
find the obviously positive contribution of monetary policy shock. The positive
contribution of monetary policy shock on inflation can also be confirmed in Fig-
ure 4.13. These two figures are consistent with the counterfactual simulation. The
impact of unconventional monetary policy on labor and inflation became larger
since 2013Q2 when the Quantitative Qualitative Easing of BoJ begun.
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Figure 4.8: Historical Decomposition of GDP Growth Rate
Figure 4.9: Historical Decomposition of Consumption Growth Rate
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Figure 4.10: Historical Decomposition of Investment Growth Rate
Figure 4.11: Historical Decomposition of Capital Price
67
Figure 4.12: Historical Decomposition of Labor
Figure 4.13: Historical Decomposition of Inflation
4.5 Concluding Remarks
We give some concluding remarks for this chapter. In this chapter, we confirmed
the availability of shadow rate in the estimation of DSGE models for Japan econ-
omy. Firstly, following the theoretical foundation proposed by Wu and Zhang
(2016), we estimated a medium-scale DSGE model with the shadow rate. By
comparing the results from pre-ZLB sub-sample estimation and full-sample es-
timation, we find that the structural parameters estimated from full-sample with
shadow rate are still reasonable and consistent compared with the pre-ZLB sam-
ple estimation. The model dynamics implied by these estimated results are also
similar and very close. This result is consistent with Sarah and Jean-Guillaume
(2016) which estimated a similar DSGE model with the shadow rate for Euro area.
The advantage of using the shadow rate in the estimation of DSGE models is that
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we can still use all techniques for linear rational expectation models, such as Kam-
lan filter and general MCMC algorithm of Bayesian estimation, without explicitly
dealing with the ZLB by difficult nonlinear techniques. Secondly, following the
simulation methodology designed by Sarah and Jean-Guillaume (2016), we iden-
tified the observed monetary policy shocks under the implementation of uncon-
ventional monetary policy and the counterfactual monetary policy shocks without
the implementation of unconventional monetary policy. Figure 4.5 shows shat in
the conventional regime of monetary policy before 1999Q1, identified shocks are
almost same, because the shadow rate is same as the call rate when the ZLB is
not binding. But after 1999Q1 when the ZLB became binding, these shocks are
quite different. We also identified other structural shocks through the ”observed”
estimation and ”counterfactual” estimation, these shocks are almost same under
different regimes because they are exogenous and not affected by different policy
regimes. Given the only difference in monetary policy shock and other structural
shocks and parameters fixed, we simulated two set of paths for model variables.
The simulation results show that, without the implementation of unconventional
monetary policy, Japan would have experienced worse economic performance
since 1999Q1. We confirmed the policy effects on most macroeconomic variables
such as GDP, investment and capital price.
Note that there may exist one defect in the estimation of DSGE models with
shadow rate. It is that the shadow rate is not endogenously derived from a struc-
tural model, but exogenously estimated by a statistical model. Short rate term
structure model is a factor model and the factors are used to fit and describe the
yield curve in a ZLB environment. But the factors have less economic interpreta-
tion. Krippner (2015) gives a structural interpretation of these factors in a linear
economy framework, but this framework is highly stylized and has less dynam-
ics than DSGE models. The estimation of the shadow rate by shadow rate term
structure model needs some nonlinear numerical calculations, this makes the en-
dogenous determination of the shadow rate in a structural DSGE framework very
difficult.
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Chapter 5
Portfolio Rebalancing Mechanism of QE in DSGE
Model
5.1 Introduction
From February 1999, when the Bank of Japan announced the commitment to the
zero interest rate policy, to April 2013, when it started Quantitative Qualitative
Easing (QQE), BoJ has implemented unconventional monetary policy for almost
15 years. Especially after the global financial crisis, many advanced economies had
to depart from conventional ways of conducting monetary policy as they faced the
Zero Lower Bound and systemic risk. The importance of unconventional mone-
tary policy has been realized by macroeconomists and central banks both theoreti-
cally and practically. Krugman (1998), Svensson (2003) and Bernanke and Reinhart
(2004) are the early contributors in this area. Unconventional monetary policy can
take many forms besides those that are generally publicly recognized. For ex-
ample, during the global financial crisis, the Danish National Bank permitted the
use of negative interest rates. In general, as one main option of unconventional
monetary policy, Quantitative Easing (QE) can be defined as the change in the
composition and size of the central bank’s balance sheet. The change can be the
result of the large asset purchases of private assets or government debt, and it can
also occur through direct lending or capital injection from the central bank to the
private sector or the financial system.
Joyce et al. (2012) comprehensively introduced the QE conducted by the Fed-
eral Reserve (Fed), Bank of England (BoE) and European Central Bank (ECB) with
a theoretical background of unconventional monetary policy. In the US, from De-
cember 2008 to the end of 2009, the Fed conducted the first phase of QE (QE1, or
officially Large-Scale Asset Purchases or LSAP) by expanding its portfolio assets
to provide liquidity to the financial system and reduce the risk premium. Follow-
ing QE1, QE2 lasted from October 2010 to June 2011 and was conducted by Feb
through the large purchase of US treasury securities. Bernanke also announced
the purchase of mortgage-backed securities (MBS) in September 2012, which is
known as QE3, with the objective of pushing down the long-term yield curve to
support financial system reconstruction and stimulate aggregate demand. During
the same period, in the UK, BoE also started a QE program by establishing the As-
set Purchase Facility (APF), the operations of which are conducted by purchasing
medium- and long-term UK government bonds.
In Japan, the first phase of QE started 15 years ago, beginning in March 2001
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and until March 2006. After a paused in operations from April 2006 to September
2010, the QE program, known as the Comprehensive Easing Policy, was restarted
from October 2010 and lasted until March 2013. Its purpose was to stimulate
the real economy and protect the financial system from the global financial cri-
sis by purchasing a variety of assets, including commercial papers (CP), Exchange
Traded Funds (ETF) and Japan Real Estate Investment Trusts (J-REITs). With the
advent of BoJ’s new president Haruhiko Kuroda, the new stage of QE known as
Quantitative Qualitative Easing (QQE) has started, with a more aggressive scale
of balance sheet expansion and with more varieties of asset purchases than in the
past. QQE is positioned as one arrow of Abenomics’ three arrows. At the same
time, BoJ clearly declared a 2% inflation target to shape the formation of expecta-
tions. Since the start of QQE from April 2013, two and a half years have pasted.
It is still ongoing, so a comprehensive evaluation and final conclusion about QQE
may be inappropriate at this time. However, we still recognize the significance of
a temporary evaluation of QQE. Most existing research about BoJ’s QE take a non-
structural approach, including VAR analysis or event study to obtain empirical
evidence about the effectiveness of QE. Especially in VAR analysis, as surveyed
by Ugai (2007), different choices of variables and specifications of models lead
to different results. In contrast to the nonstructural econometric approach, the
DSGE framework has inherent advantages for policy evaluation. The transmis-
sion mechanism of monetary policy can be identified with clear explanation based
on economic theory. In addition, to the best of my knowledge, no trials have been
done in this area. For these reasons, we conduct an empirical project to evaluate
the QQE of BoJ in this study.
The remainder of the study is organized as follows. Section 5.2 describes the
derivation of the model. Section 5.3 is the calibration of the model’s structural
parameters and the steady state. Section 5.4 presents the results of simulation
with sensitivity analysis. Section 5.5 concludes this chapter.
5.2 DSGE with Portfolio Rebalancing Mechanism
As noted by Meier (2009), there are different approaches to unconventional mone-
tary policy, which can be motivated by alternative views of the transmission chan-
nels and their effect on the economy. The model developed here has the standard
structure and specification of the New Keynesian DSGEmodel, but the bond trad-
ing market proposed by Ljungqvist and Sargent (2012, Chapter 13, Section 8) is in-
corporated to isolate the portfolio rebalancing mechanism of large asset purchases by
the central bank. Tobin (1969) initially described this mechanism, whereby varia-
tion in relative supplies of financial assets with different maturities and liquidities
triggered by large asset purchases of the central bank can have a real effect on
the yield curve due to imperfect asset substitutability. Tobin and Brainard (1963)
define the imperfect substitution assumption as follows:
Assets are assumed to be imperfect substitutes for each other in wealth-
owners’ portfolios. That is, an increase in the rate of return on any one
asset will lead to an increase in the fraction of wealth held in that asset, and
to a decrease or at most no change in the fraction held in every other asset.
Relating this assumption to unconventional monetary policy, the basic idea is that
the central bank’s purchase of assets held by the private sector increases the prices
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of these assets. As asset prices increase, yields fall, stimulating aggregate demand.
Even when the short-term nominal interest rate faces ZLB, asset purchases can be
a practical policy instrument for the central bank. As described later, large-scale
purchases of government bonds by BoJ can be evaluated using this approach in a
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium framework.
5.2.1 Household
There is a continuum of representative households, existing continuously in i 2
(0, 1), where i is indexation1. The representative household derives utility from
consumption Ct and real money balance MtPt and disutility from labor supply Lt.
The utility function is additively separable,
Ut =
(Ct   qCt 1)1 s
1  s +
1
1  x
✓
Mt
Pt
◆1 x
  hL
1+ c
L1+ct
where s is inverse of elasticity of inter-temporal substitution, q is degree of habit
formation, x is the interest rate semielasticity of money demand and c is the in-
verse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply. hL is a preference parameter which
measures the relative weight of disutility from labor supply. The household maxi-
mizes the discounted infinite stream of utility subject to the inter-temporal budget
constraint and the standard law of motion of capital accumulation. #ut is a pref-
erence shock process following #ut = ru#
u
t 1 + µut and µut ⇠ N(0, s2u) is an i.i.d
exogenous shock.
Et
•
Â
t=s
bte#
u
t Ut
✓
Ct,
Mt
Pt
, Lt
◆
BS,t
PtRS,t
+
BHL,t(1+ ACB,t)
PtRL,t
+
Mt
Pt
+ It(1+ ACK,t)
=
BS,t 1
Pt
+
BHL,t 1
PtRS,t
+
Mt 1
Pt
+ wtLt + qtKt   Ct   Tt
Kt = It + (1  d)Kt 1
The household allocates wealth among real money holdings MtPt , capital Kt with
rental rate qt and two types of government bonds2, short-term bonds BS,t, whose
maturities are equal to or shorter than 1 year with yield RS,t, and long-term bonds
BHL,t
3, whose maturities are equal to or longer than 10 years with yield RL,t. The
household supplies labor Lt and receives real wages wt and pays a real lump-sum
tax Tt at the general aggregate price level Pt. Investment It and capital accumula-
tion processes occur with adjustment cost
ACK,t =
jK
2
✓
It
Kt
◆2
1Indexation of each household is omitted because they are homogenous and identical.
2This kind of classification in also used in the calibration of model, steady-state ratio of
two kinds of bonds with different maturities relative to the total amount of government
bonds.
3BHL,t means the long-term bonds held by households.
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and the portfolio adjustment between two kinds of bonds also accompanies with
cost,
ACB,t =
jB
2
 
kB
BS,t
BHL,t
  1
!2
Yt
where kB is the steady-state ratio of long-term bond holdings of the household
to short-term bond holdings B
H
L
BS
, so at the steady state, the portfolio is adjusted to
its optimal allocation and adjustment cost, which is paid in terms of the house-
hold’s income of zero. The first order conditions of the household’s maximization
with respect to consumption, labor supply, real money, short-term bond, long-
term bond, capital and investment are given by Equations (5.1) to (5.7).
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(5.7)
lt and µt are two Lagrange multipliers corresponding with budget constraint
and law of motion of capital accumulation respectively. Pt+1 =
Pt+1
Pt is the gross
inflation rate at t+ 1 period. Bonds and money are rewritten in real terms bHL,t =
BHL,t
Pt , bS,t =
BS,t
Pt and mt =
Mt
Pt by lower case letters for convenience.
Before proceeding, it is worth discussing the adjustment cost of the portfolio
introduced above. There are necessary conditions under which the purchase of
private sector assets or government securities by the central bank can be effective.
As discussed by Eggertsson and Woodford (2004), if representative agents who
have rational expectations with an infinite time horizon and face no credit fric-
tions or restrictions consider the assets held by the government and by the central
bank as indistinguishable from assets held by themselves, then asset purchases
by the central bank change nothing. This proposition is similar and analogous to
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the Ricardian Equivalence in fiscal theory. But if credit or financial frictions and
borrowing constraints do exist, then this proposition no longer holds. In Cu´rdia
and Woodford (2011), one unconventional monetary policy, direct facility lending
from the central bank to the private sector (credit easing), does affect the aggre-
gate economy. Kiyotaki and Moore (2012) described a monetary economy with
heterogeneous liquidity of financial assets. In their model, when entrepreneurs
want to undertake new investment projects, they can only finance a limited pro-
portion by issuing new equities. Therefore, purchases of such less-liquid equities
by the central bank can change their prices, leading to real effects on investment
decisions. This is known as the credit channel of QE. Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010)
and Gertler and Karadi (2011) also made contributions in this area. The frame-
work in the research mentioned above is highly complicated as it includes the full
sketch of financial intermediaries or the banking sector. In this study, we focus
only on the portfolio rebalancing channel of QE. This approach is more appro-
priate for the QE implemented by BoJ4. Falagiarda and Marzo (2012), Falagiarda
(2014) and Chen et al. (2012) take the same approach to evaluating the QE of the
Fed and BoE. Rationale for including portfolio adjustment frictions is intuitional.
As mentioned by Falagiarda (2014), long-term bond holdings have less liquidity.
Households realize this risk and hold short-term bonds as precautionary liquidity
holdings relative to their longer-term investments. Another justification for this
adjustment cost comes from the theory of preferred habit. Vayanos and Vila (2009)
emphasised that agents have preferences for different bond maturities, and any
deviation from the preferred portfolio allocation is costly. More simply, manage-
ment of the portfolio itself is costly.
5.2.2 Intermediate Good Firm and Final Good Firm
In the same way as the standard New Keynesian DSGE models, final good firms
produce homogenous final goods by bundling differentiated intermediate goods
with CES technology, so the intermediate goods market is monopolistic. We use
Calvo (1983) type of staggered price setting to replicate rigidity of price. As pointed
to by Wordfood (2003), the output of all intermediate good firms is equal to the
output of all final good firms, and the aggregate production function holds at the
steady state when the dispersion of price is unity.
Yt =
✓Z 1
0
Y
1
1+et
f ,t d f
◆1+et
f 2 (0, 1) is the indexation of each intermediate good firm and et is time-varying
price mark-up that has a relationship et = 1st 1 > 0 with the elasticity of substitu-
tion st > 1 between different intermediate goods. After log-linearizing the model,
time varying price mark-up et can be represented as a cost-push mark-up shock
process that follows #pt = rp#
p
t 1 + µ
p
t where µ
p
t ⇠ N(0, s2p) is an i.i.d shock. Cost
minimization of final good firms leads to the intermediate good demand function
4BoJ also purchases risky assets such as ETFs and J-REITs from the private sector, but
the quantity of these purchases is very less than the quantity purchased of Japanese gov-
ernment bonds.
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and aggregate price index.
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◆  1+etet
Yt
Under Calve (1983) type price setting, each period, 1  h fraction of all intermedi-
ate good firms have the chance to adjust price to their optimal level and the others
just index their prices to a weighted average of inflation of last period and steady
state with the weight 1  g and g respectively.
Pf ,t+j = Pf ,t+j 1P
g
t+j 1P
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Intermediate good firms first minimize the cost of production wtL f ,t + qtK f ,t sub-
ject to its production technology,
Yf ,t = e#
a
t L1 af ,t K
a
f ,t   f
where f is fixed cost keeping the all intermediate good firms’ profits zero at steady
state. #at represents the TFP that follows #
a
t = ra#
a
t 1 + µat . µat ⇠ N(0.s2a ) is an I.I.D
shock driving TFP precess.
Kf ,t
L f ,t
=
awt
(1  a)qt
Aggregating the first-order condition of cost minimization over each intermediate
good firm by
R 1
0 Kf ,td f = Kt and
R 1
0 L f ,td f = Lt leads to the relationship aggregate
capital stock and labor supply.
Kt
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=
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Marginal cost is identical among all intermediate good firms.
MCt =
✓
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a
⌘a
(5.9)
Then intermediate good firms set the optimal price to maximize the discounted
profits.
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First order condition is given by (5.10).
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Here P⇤t represents the optimal price set at period t. The law of motion of general
price level is given by aggregating the optimal prices set by all intermediate good
firms in each period.
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Log-linearization of (5.10) and (5.11) leads to the hybrid NKPC. Final aggregate
output with price dispersion5 Qt =
R 1
0
⇣ Pf ,t
Pt
⌘  1+etet d f equal to the aggregate of all
intermediate output.
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5.2.3 Fiscal and Monetary Authorities
The government-central bank budget constraint is given by:
BS,t
PtRS,t
+
BL,t
PtRL,t
+
DSt
Pt
=
BS,t 1
Pt
+
BL,t 1
PtRS,t
+ Gt   Tt (5.13)
where BL,t and BS,t are the total amount of long-term government bond and short-
term government bond respectively. The central bank holds long-term govern-
ment bonds BCBL,t as an asset and supplies money as a liability, so its balance sheet
5As proved in Galı´ (2015, Chapter 3), at steady state, price dispersion Qt is approximate
to unity at first-order and zero at second-order, which means that all intermediate good
firms choose the same price, and price dispersion disappears at steady state.
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variation DSt can be represented as the change of these two parts.
DSt
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Mt  Mt 1
Pt
 
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PtRS,t
!
(5.14)
Central bank holdings of long-term governments bonds are a fraction xt of the
total amount of long-term bonds. All households hold the remaining long-term
bonds6. The asset purchase by the central bank can be described by the variation
of this fraction variable xt that we assume it as an AR (1) process.
BCBL,t = xtBL,t (5.15)
Combing (5.13), (5.14) and (5.15) by cancelling DStPt and B
CB
L,t and rewriting nom-
inal terms in real terms leads to the government-central bank budget constraint
represented by (5.16).
bS,t
RS,t
+
bL,t
RL,t
+mt   mt 1Pt  
✓
xt
bL,t
RL,t
  xt 1 bL,t 1PtRS,t
◆
=
bS,t 1
Pt
+
bL,t 1
PtRS,t
+ Gt   Tt (5.16)
BHL,t = (1  xt)BL,t (5.17)
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x is the fraction of the central bank’s long-term bond holdings B
CB
L
BL at steady state. µ
x
t ⇠
N(0, s2x ) is an i.i.d shock to drive the asset purchase process. By calibrating the size of
µxt and rx, we can simulate the effect of asset purchase by the central bank on aggregate
economic activity. rx needs to be calibrated carefully because it represents the exit strategy
of the central bank about when the central bank stops the QE and returns to the normal
amount of government debt holdings.
Government spending is assumed to follow an AR (1) process with shock term µgt ⇠
N(0, s2g). Long-term bonds supplied by government is assumed to be AR (1) process, as in
Zagaglia (2013), where µbLt ⇠ N(0, s2bL ).
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As proposed by Leeper (1991), to prevent the inflation triggered by the fiscal ex-
pansion, a passive fiscal policy rule is introduced by Falagiarda (2014) to charac-
terize the tax collection as a function of total government’s debt,
Tt = t + tS
✓
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Pt
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  bL
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(5.21)
where tS and tL are parameters that represent the reaction to the bonds’ deviation
from the steady-state value. Lump-sum tax Tt at steady state is t. Because Tt is
6This is not true for real economy because other financial institutions can hold govern-
ment debt. In this model, financial intermediaries are neglected and we can explain that all
private sector households hold the remaining long-term bonds.
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real tax income of government, the bonds are also represented in real terms bL,t
and bS,t. From this specification we can know that deviation of government debt
from long-run steady state can be offset or compensated by the lump-sum tax
collection from households.
The central bank is assumed to follow a Taylor (1993) rule.
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Inflation targetP⇤t is assumed to be AR (1) process where µp
⇤
t ⇠ N(0, s2p⇤ ) is an i.i.d shock.
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Monetary policy shock is also assumed to be AR (1) process with disturbance term
µrt ⇠ N(0, s2r ).
#rt = rr#
r
t 1 + µrt (5.24)
5.2.4 Equilibrium and Asset Market
Finally, we close the model by imposing aggregate resource constraint.
Yt = Ct + Gt + It(1+ ACK,t) +
bHL,t
RL,t
ACB,t (5.25)
The total output is allocated to consumption, investment government expenditure
and two types of adjustment cost. This completes the description of the model.
Steady state and log-linearization are given in Appendix.
Before proceeding to to numerical simulation, we do some analytical inves-
tigation about asset market to check the transmission mechanism of QE. Log-
linearizing first order condition7 (5.4) and (5.5) and combing them by cancelling
l˜t, l˜t+1 and pt+1 leads to (5.26):
R˜L,t = R˜S,t +Et R˜S,t+1  
✓
kbjBY
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+ jBY
◆
b˜S,t +
✓
kbjBY
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+ jBY
◆
b˜HL,t (5.26)
where parameters in (5.4) and (5.5) can be cancelled using the steady-state values8.
From (5.26), we can find that long-term interest rate is positively related to the
short-term interest rate, the expectation of short-term interest rate and long-term
bonds held by private sector, but negatively related to short-term bonds because
of the imperfect substitution of two kinds of bond assets. When central bank pur-
chases long-term bond from private sector, long-term interest rate can be reduced
to stimulate the economy. Conversely, when the central bank reduces long-term
7See Appendix for log-linearization of the model.
8See Appendix for steady state of the model.
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bond holdings, less liquid asset (long-term bond) holdings of private sector in-
creases, leading to increasing of the interest rate spread. This mechanism, portfolio
rebalancing channel of QE can be summarized as below.
bCBL,t ") bHL,t #, bS,t ") b˜HL,t < 0, b˜S,t > 0) R˜L,t < 0) RL,t #) RL,t   RS,t #
bCBL,t #) bHL,t ", bS,t #) b˜HL,t > 0, b˜S,t < 0) R˜L,t > 0) RL,t ") RL,t   RS,t "
Note that the parameter jB represents the degree of adjustment cost in portfo-
lio management. The existence of the adjustment cost makes the standard arbi-
trage condition invalid. When this friction disappears, jB = 0, the first order
condition (5.4) and (5.5)’s log-linearization simplifies to the standard Euler equa-
tion, arbitrage equation and the term structure between long-term interest rate and
short-term interest rate which are familiar in the standard DSGE models without
adjustment cost of assets with different maturities.
l˜t = R˜S,t +Et(l˜t+1   pt+1)
l˜t = R˜L,t +Et(l˜t+1   pt+1   R˜S,t+1)
R˜L,t = R˜S,t +Et R˜S,t+1
To check the QE’s transmission mechanism from asset market to real economy,
combing the log-linearization of (5.4) and (5.5) by cancelling bond variables b˜S,t  
b˜HL,t yields the Euler equation of consumption.
l˜t = Et(l˜t+1 + pt+1) +
RS
kB + RS
R˜S,t +
kB
kB + RS
(R˜L,t  Et R˜S,t+1) (5.27)
Following the analysis of transmission mechanism inside asset market, the trans-
mission mechanism from asset market to real economy can be summarized as be-
low.
RL,t #) R˜L,t < 0) l˜t < 0) lt #) Ct ") Yt "
Summarizing the whole analysis given previously, the story of QE in this model
can be described as follows:
Long-term bond purchases by the central bank leads to the change of as-
sets with different maturities, so does the assets returns (from (5.26)). Con-
sequently, the real economy is stimulated through the general equilibrium
(from (5.27).
Analytical investigation given above describes the whole scenario. To check ac-
curate dynamics triggered by asset purchase by the central bank, we conduct a
calibration exercise.
5.3 Calibration
This model is developed to simulate the effects of QQE conducted by BoJ from
April, 2013. The benchmark calibration of the steady state is to adjust to match the
quarterly data over the most recent periods prior to the April, 2013. Steady-state
values can be calculated from the data. GDP at steady state is normalized to unit.
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Total government debt bS + bL, short-term debt9 bS and long-term debt10 bL, long-
term debt held by private sector bHL and the central bank b
CB
L , are obtained from
OECD Statistical Database, Ministry of Finance Japan11 and BoJ, and calculated as
the relative ratio to output.
Notation Description Steady-State Value12
Y Output 1 (normalization)
C Consumption 0.6114
I Investment 0.2173
L Labor Supply13 0.2308
G Government Expenditure 0.119
T Lump-sum Tax 0.1196
RS Gross Short-Term Interest Rate 1.01
RL Gross Long-Term Interest Rate 1.0201
P Gross Inflation Rate 1.0039
bS + bL Total Debt 1.5493
bS Total Short-Term Debt 0.0869
bL Total Long-Term Debt 1.4624
bCBL Long-Term Debt held by Central Bank 0.2296
bHL Long-Term Debt held by Private Sector 1.2328
kB Steady-State Ratio of
bHL
bS
14.1864
x Steady-State Ratio of b
CB
L
bL 0.1570
Table 5.1: Calibration for Steady State
Structural parameters and policy parameters are directly obtained from other
DSGE literature. Parameters like discount factor b, capital share a and deprecia-
tion rate d are set to their general values. Average mark-up rate in economy is set
to 0.2. Calvo (1983) type price rigidity set equal to 0.75 implies an average price
duration of 4 quarters, a value consistent with much of the empirical evidence.
Parameters in monetary policy rule equation take the standard values in a way
consistent with Taylor’s original rule. To reflect a situation similar to ZLB, rR is
set at a highly persistent value 0.995 to prevent the short-term interest rate from
responding to inflation and output change, also as proposed by Falagiarda (2014),
to avoid indeterminacy of model’s solution.
9Short-term debt bS includes bond held by the central bank as the operation instrument
in interbank market plus bonds with maturity less than or equal to one year.
10Long-term debt bL is calculated by subtracting its amount from total debt.
11http://www.mof.go.jp/jgbs/reference/appendix/index.htm
12For other steady-state values, see Appendix.
13The steady state of labor supply is calculated by assuming that the share of representa-
tive household’s time endowment spent on labor supply L1 L is equal to 0.3.
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Notation Description Value
a Capital Share 0.36
d Depreciation Rate 0.025
b Discount Factor 0.994
q Habit Formation 0.7
f Fixed Cost in Production 0.2
c Inverse of Frisch Elasticity of Labor Supply 5
s Inverse of Inter-temporal Substitution (Risk Aversion) 2
x Interest Rate Semielasticity of Money Demand 4
h Calvo (1983) type Price Rigidity 0.75
g Price Indexation 0.5
e Steady-State Mark-up Rate 0.2
jB Portfolio Adjustment Friction14 0.01
jK Investment Adjustment Friction15 770.6056
t Steady-State Lump-sum Tax 0.1196
tS Response to Short-Term Debt Deviation 0.3
tL Response to Long-Term Debt Deviation 0.3
jY Response to Output 0.25
jp Response to Inflation 1.5
rR Monetary Policy Smoothing 0.995
Table 5.2: Calibration for Structural and Policy Parameters
Two key parameters rx and s2x are calibrated to replicate QE’s persistence and
scale16. Recall that BoJ has announced at April 4, 2013 that the long-term bond
held by BoJ will be increased from 89 trillion yen to 190 trillion yen from the end
of 2012 to end of 2014, which means 113.48% increasing of long-term bond hold-
ings. Considering the inaccuracy of calibration, the sx is set to be 1 to simulate
the effect of long-term bond purchase by BoJ. sp⇤ is set to 0.02 which means a 2%
inflation target is introduced when this shock happens. Other exogenous shock
parameters are set to usually used values.
14In other similar research, this parameter is set to different values such as Chen et al.
(2012) (0.015), Andre´s et al. (2004) (0.045), Harrison (2011, 2012) (0.1, 0.09). Following Fala-
giarda (2014), jB is set to 0.01 which means that 1% of household’s income is paid for the
portfolio adjustment cost. Sensitivity analysis given in next section checks the role of this
parameter in portfolio rebalancing channel of QE.
15Note that jK is derived from the steady state of first order conditions (5.6) and (5.7).
See Appendix.
16This calibration is conducted by checking the impulse response of x˜t = rx x˜t 1 + µxt
through trial and error. Just like parameter jB, these two parameters rx and sx are also
assumed to be important in the portfolio rebalancing channel of QE. Sensitivity analysis will
be given in next section.
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Description AR (1) Value S.D. Value
Technology ra 0.95 sa 0.01
Asset Purchase rx 0.83 sx 1
Long-Term Bond Supply rbL 0.9 sbL 0.01
Government Expenditure rg 0.9 sg 0.01
Inflation Target rp⇤ 0.9 sp⇤ 0.02
Preference ru 0.9 su 0.01
Price Mark-up rp 0.9 sp 0.01
Monetary Policy rr 0.9 sr 0.01
Table 5.3: Calibration for Shock Process Parameters
5.4 Simulation of QE Policy
Using the benchmark calibration, now we report the simulation results of long-
term bond purchase by BoJ. We consider a scenario that the central bank increases
its long-term bond holdings 100% and takes 6 years to gradually return to its nor-
mal level.
5.4.1 Benchmark Simulation of QE Policy
Figure 5.1: Impulse Response of QE Policy Shock
From Figure 5.1, QE has a strong effect on output and investment. Peak impact
on output and investment is almost 0.56% and 1.41%. The effect stimulated by QE
lasts for almost 5 quarters. As set up in the scenario, the central bank increases
its long-term bond holdings (In Figure 5.1, panel CB_LT) on its balance sheet by
100% and will return to a normal level 6 years later. During the same period,
long-term bonds held by the private sector (In Figure 5.1, panel PS_LT) decrease
18.62% and will return to a normal level 6 years later. The inflation rate increases
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0.47% from the stimulation from QE. The long-term interest rate, which is critical
to the investment, decreases 0.5%. Considering the low interest rate environment
existing in Japan economy, 0.5% decreasing of yield curve is not a small number.
As long as the QE has its effect, the long-term interest rate is suppressed to a low
level. From the simulation results, we can conclude that the mechanism analyzed
in Section 5.2.4 is appropriate. In addition, the effect stimulated by asset purchase
is limited because it merely lasts for just more than one year. In this study, we do
not explicitly introduce the balance sheet of the central bank, and the operations
by BoJ are more complicated than what we simulated, but the positive effect of QE
on the real economy can be identified with rigorous structural explanation.
5.4.2 Sensitivity Simulation of QE Policy
We consider different exit strategies of the central bank’s QE and its effects. The
benchmark simulation is set to be a 6-years QE policy for rx = 0.83 (blue line
in Figure 5.2). As the sensitivity analysis done in the Falagiarda (2014), we run
two more simulations for a long-lasting QE policy (8-years and rx = 0.88, green
line in Figure 5.2) and short-lasting QE policy (4-years and rx = 0.76, red line in
Figure 5.2). Figure 5.2 shows that the longer the duration of QE, the stronger its
effect. Especially for long-term interest rate, we can conclude that the push-down
effect of QE to long-term interest rate lasts longer when the QE policy has a high
persistence.
(a) IRF of Output to QE (b) IRF of Investment to QE
(c) IRF of Inflation to QE (d) IRF of Long-Term Interest Rate to QE
Figure 5.2: Sensitivity of QE Policy Shock
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QE Persistence Output Investment Inflation Long-Term Interest Rate
rx = 0.76 (4 years) 0.42% 1.06% 0.30% -51bp
rx = 0.83 (6 years) 0.56% 1.41% 0.47% -50bp
rx = 0.88 (8 years) 0.74% 1.87% 0.70% -47bp
Table 5.4: Simulated Peak Impact of QE
As mentioned above in Section 5.3, jB is also considered to have a critical role
in the effect of QE. Similar sensitivity analysis has been done for other two cases,
higher portfolio adjustment cost (jB = 0.02) and lower portfolio adjustment cost
(jB = 0.005), and compared with the benchmark case (jB = 0.01). The results
is similar to Figure 5.2 so we don’t report the IRF again here. Sensitivity analysis
shows that with higher portfolio adjustment cost, short-term bond and long-term
bond become less substitutable. The asset purchase conducted by the central bank
consequently has macroeconomic effects. The effects are also amplified as jB in-
creases. Also, when jB = 0, two kinds of bond are perfectly substitutable and no
effects can be generated by QE.
5.5 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, a DSGE model has been developed to capture the portfolio rebal-
ancing channel of QE, and the model is calibrated to match the Japanese economy
and BoJ’s policy. There are two main conclusions from the simulation. The first
is that the QE policy conducted by BoJ does have an effect on the real economy,
pushing up output and inflation and pushing down long-term interest rates to
stimulate investment. The peak impact on output is moderate for the benchmark
case 0.42%, and the pushing-up effect lasts for merely 5 quarters, but the pushing-
down effect on long-term rates is persistent, lasting for the whole period when
the policy is effective. As QE’s period becomes longer, the effect becomes larger.
Under the same level of asset purchases, the central bank should announce a long-
lasting time frame for QE policy. The second conclusion is that the key assumption
in this study, imperfect substitution of different assets and the corresponding cost
of portfolio adjustment cost, is critical to the effectiveness of QE. The key parame-
ter jB is not a policy-controlled variable. If the central bank wishes to increase the
effectiveness of QE, a larger scale and longer period are two options.
Another contribution is that the model developed here can be extended to
more rigorous specifications of economic agents, such as the balance sheet of the
central bank and the introduction of different assets. Recall that another important
channel of QE, the credit channel, can be verified with the incorporation of financial
intermediaries and other financial frictions.
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Chapter 6
Summary and Outlook
Let we get a brief summary of this doctoral thesis and then talk about the out-
look for future research. The basic idea for Chapter 2, Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 is
that we consider the shadow rate, which has been estimated from a shadow/ZLB-
GATSM in Chapter 2, as a consistent quantitative measure of monetary policy
stance in ZLB environment, then we use this measure to evaluate the effect of un-
conventional monetary policy conducted by Bank of Japan.
In Chapter 2, we firstly introduce the basic specification of term structure
model, GATSM, and then following the method proposed by Krippner (2012), we
extend this basic framework to adapt the ZLB environment, explicitly allowing the
zero lower bound for short interest rate. We put the estimated shadow rate and
other two related quantitative measures in a context of monetary policy regime of
BoJ along the time line. The estimated shadow rate shows very good traceability
of monetary policy stance. There exists one problem that since the shadow/ZLB-
GATSM is not compatible with negative interest rate, so we can’t get the accurate
estimates of shadow rate since 2016M2. We also firstly derive the information
about how long the ZLB environment will last from the estimated Expected Time
to Zero (ETZ). Though this measure is less important than the shadow rate, but
it provides the expectation of market which may be a valuable reference for the
policy decisions of central bank. In Chapter 2, we also calculated Effective Mon-
etary Stimulus (EMS), the area of gap between observed yield curve and neutral
interest rate. The stimulative degree of monetary policy among different policy
regimes can be compared through the lens of the EMS.
In Chapter 3, we check the capability of shadow rate by using two typical
econometric methods in empirical macroeconomics, a NK-DSGE model and a
TVP-SV VAR model. The integration of shadow rate and NK-DSGE model pro-
posed by Wu and Zhang (2016) is based on the empirical relationship between
shadow rate and the balance sheet of central bank. Strictly speaking, this is not
a rigorous micro-foundation, but it is convenient to use the shadow rate in DSGE
model without considering the technical difficulties of ZLB. The empirical results,
estimated structural parameters, impulse response and historical decomposition,
are also very robust even we use the estimated shadow rate in the framework
of NK-DSGE. Historical decomposition shows the positive contribution of mon-
etary policy to the improvement of both output gap and inflation since 2013Q3.
TVP-SV VAR model is non-structural, only providing statistical results about the
time-varying dynamics when we use the shadow rate in ZLB period. We find that
even the increasing of negative shadow rate can still trigger the decreasing of out-
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put gap and inflation. This finding convinces us to use the shadow rate to analyze
the monetary policy in ZLB environment. Following Chapter 3, we estimate a
medium-scale DSGE model in Chapter 4 and conduct counterfactual simulation.
The structural parameters estimated with the shadow rate are quite reasonable.
Counterfactual simulation shows that without the implementation of unconven-
tional monetary policy, Japan economy would have worse performance that its
actual realization.
Chapter 5 uses a calibrated medium-scale DSGEmodel with endogenous term
structure to simulate the effect the QE policy on the holding structure of govern-
ment bond. Sensitive simulation shows that higher persistence of QE policy can
lead to longer-lasting decreasing of long-term rate, along with higher instanta-
neous impact on the real economy. We don’t estimate the model in Chapter 5
because it is difficult to describe the path of bond purchase that is consistent with
the actual policy actions of BoJ. But we can still get some policy implications from
the experimental simulation, announcement of a long-lasting QE policy can trig-
ger more effective macroeconomic effect.
We must admit that there still exists many flaws in this research. For example,
the time span is limited to the end of 2016M1. After the start of QQEwith negative
interest rate, we can’t get accurate estimate of shadow rate and we have to give up
the further analysis beyond 2016M1. Also, declaring again, the empirical relation-
ship which we rely on to incorporate the shadow rate into structural models is not
rigorously theoretical. We have to admit that this approach has some arbitrariness,
but on the other hand, this approach is very convenient and simple.
There exists some perspectives for future research. Firstly, given the realization
of negative interest rate, we have to figure out a way to deal with negative inter-
est rate in term structure model, in a reasonable, mathematical-consistent fashion.
Secondly, we should establish a theoretical-consistent estimation of shadow rate,
not from a factor model with less economic interpretation, but something like a
joint estimation of structural macroeconomic model and shadow rate with rigor-
ous theoretical foundation, which can explain the existence of negative interest
rate reasonably with rigorous theoretical foundation. Thirdly, this research takes a
totally macroeconomic vision with less attention on the effects of unconventional
monetary policy effects from a microeconomic vision. Is it easy for firms and
households to borrow money from banks due to the implementation of uncon-
ventional monetary policy? Dose the behavior of microeconomic agents change
due to the different monetary policy regimes? Such questions can be clarified only
in micro-econometric procedures.
Finally, we have to say that what we know about the unconventional monetary
policy is still limited, not only for macroeconomics from an academic view, but
also for central banks from a practical view, so it is worth to keep tracking this
topic in the future.
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Appendix
Appendix for Chapter 1
In Appendix for Chapter 1, we derive a standardNewKeynesianDynamic Stochas-
tic General Equilibrium (NK-DSGE) model which is used through this doctoral
thesis. This model is also used in Chapter 3.
A representative infinitely-living household maximizes lifetime utility
Et
•
Â
t=0
bt
"
C1 st
1  s  
cL1+ht
1+ h
#
subject to the budget constraint
Ct +
Bt
Pt
 R
B
t 1Bt 1
Pt
+WtLt + Tt
where Ct and Lt denote household’s consumption and labor supply. Pt is the price
level. The nominal gross bond return paid for bonds Bt is RBt 1. Wt is real wage
and Tt is the real transfer. Two first-order conditions decide the optimal decision
of consumption and labor supply
C st = bEtR
B
t
 
C st+1
Pt+1
!
Wt =
cLht
C st
where Pt+1 =
Pt+1
Pt is the gross inflation from t period to t+ 1 period. The spec-
ification of intermediate good firms and final good firms is same as the standard
NK-DSGE model. A continuum of intermediate good firms exist, producing het-
erogenous intermediate goods and selling them into final good firms. Let Yt be the
output of the final good which is produced using inputs of the intermediate goods
according to a bundle production function
Yt =
Z 1
0
Y
# 1
#
j,t dj
  #
# 1
where # > 1 is the elasticity of substitution among differentiated intermediate
goods and Yj,t is the input of intermediate good j 2 [0, 1]. Final good firms in
completely competitive market maximize profits
max
Yj,t
PtYt  
Z 1
0
Pj,tYj,tdj
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subject to the bundle production function. The optimal input for intermediate
good Yj,t is
Yj,t =
✓Pj,t
Pt
◆ #
Yt
and the zero profit condition of final good market leads to the general price level
index Pt.
Pt =
✓Z 1
0
P1 #j,t dj
◆ 1
1 #
Intermediate good firms produce and sell differentiated products to final good
firms in monopolistically competitive markets. A intermediate good firm j min-
imizes the total cost WtLj,t subject to a Cobb-Douglas production function given
by
Yj,t = AtL1 aj,t
where At is aggregate productivity shock and Lj,t is labor input. Cost minimiza-
tion leads to the real marginal cost.
MCj,t =
Wt
At(1  a)(Yj,t/At) a/(1 a)
Define the economy-wide average real marginal cost as
MCt =
Wt
At(1  a)(Yt/At) a/(1 a)
and the relation between intermediate good firm j’s marginal cost and the economy-
wide average real marginal cost is
MCj,t = MCt
 
Yt
Yj,t
!  a
1 a
= MCt
✓Pj,t
Pt
◆ #a
a 1
which can be derived by the demand curve of intermediate good j. Intermediate
good firm’s objective is to maximize the discounted present value of real profits
according to Calvo (1983) price setting mechanism
max
P⇤t
Et
•
Â
t=0
(bq)k
Lt+k
Lt
✓P⇤t Yj,t+k|t
Pt+k
 MCj,t+kYj,t+k|t
◆
subject to demand curve of Yj,t+k|t,
Yj,t+k|t =
✓
P⇤t
Pt+k
◆ #
Yt+k
where q is the probability that the intermediate good firm can’t adjust its price and
Lt is the Lagrange multiplier in the optimization of household which represents
the marginal utility of consumption. The first-order condition leads to the optimal
price setting for intermediate firm
P⇤t =
#
#  1
Et Â•k=0(bq)
kLt+kP#t+kYt+kMCj,t+k|t
Et Â•k=0(bq)kLt+kP
# 1
t+k Yt+k
88
where MCj,t+k|t = MCt+k
⇣
P⇤t
Pt+k
⌘ #a
a 1 . By a law of large number, a fraction q of
intermediate good firms can’t adjust prices and keep prices at the previous period
price level Pt 1 and the remaining fraction 1  q of intermediate good firms adjust
to the new level P⇤t , so the price level Pt =
⇣R 1
0 P
1 #
j,t dj
⌘ 1
1 # can be rewritten as a
weighted sum of all intermediate good firms’ prices.
P1 #t = qP
1 #
t 1 + q (P
⇤
t )
1 #
Under flexible price equilibrium, q = 0 and price rigidity disappears. The
optimal price setting of intermediate good firm is the standard result in microeco-
nomics
P⇤t = Pt
#
#  1MCj,t
where ## 1 can be explained as a markup charged by the intermediate good firm.
When prices are flexible, all intermediate good firms are symmetric and charge the
same price such that P⇤t = Pt, MCj,t = # 1# , Yj,t = Yt and Lj,t = Lt for all j. Real
wage is equal to marginal productivity of labor.
Wt =
#  1
#
(1  a)AtL at
Combining this equation to the first-order condition of household’s labor supply
leads to
cLht
C st
=
#  1
#
(1  a)AtL at
from which we can solve the output Y ft with the resource constraint Yt = Ct =
AtL1 at under flexible price equilibrium.
Y ft =

(#  1)(1  a)
#c
  1 a
s(1 a)+h+a
A
1+h
s(1 a)+a+h
t
Log-linearization of all equilibrium conditions of final good and intermediate
good firms leads to the standard New Keynesian Phillips Curve
pt = bEtpt+1 +
(1  q)(1  bq)(1  a)
q(1  a+ #a) dMCt
where dMCt = h + a+ s(1  a)1  a Yˆt   1+ h1  a Aˆt
is the percentage deviation of economy-wide average real marginal cost. Using
the output under flexible price equilibrium, this can be written as
dMCt = h + a+ s(1  a)1  a ⇣Yˆt   Yˆ ft ⌘ = h + a+ s(1  a)1  a xt
where xt = Yˆt   Yˆ ft can be explained as the output gap. So relation between the
inflation and the output gap can be rewritten as
pt = bEtpt+1 + kxt
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where k = (1 q)(1 bq)[h+a+s(1 a)]q(1 a+#a) . Similarly, log-linearization of the household’s
Euler equation leads to
Yˆt = EtYˆt+1   1s
⇣
rBt + ln b Etpt+1
⌘
which also holds at the flexible price equilibrium as
Yˆ ft = EtYˆ
f
t+1  
1
s
⇣
rNt + ln b
⌘
where rNt =   ln b+ s
⇣
EtYˆ
f
t+1   Yˆ ft
⌘
is the natural interest rate. Using the defi-
nition of output gap, the New Keynesian IS curve is
xt = Etxt+1   1s
⇣
rBt  Etpt+1   rNt
⌘
where rNt =   ln b+ s(1+h)s(1 a)+a+h
 
Et Aˆt+1   Aˆt
 
only depends on exogenous pro-
ductivity shock.
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Appendix for Chapter 2
In Appendix for Chapter 2, we give the derivation of a two-factor shadow/ZLB-
GATSM. Expectation of short interest rate:
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Selected Fitted and Observed Yield Curves
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Conceptual Image of Effective Monetary Stimulus from Krippner (2015,
P256)
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Appendix for Chapter 3
TVP-SV VARModel
In Appendix for Chapter 3, we give some technical details of TVP-SV VAR model.
We consider the VAR model with following specification,
Yt = ct + B1,tYt 1 + · · · Bs,tYt s + ut
where ut ⇠ N(0,Wt) is the disturbance term. Yt = (Y1,t,Y2,t, · · ·Yk,t)0 is a vector
with k variables. Parameters ct, B1,t, · · · Bs,t,Wt are all time-varying. The variance-
covariance matrix of the disturbance term Wt can be represented in following
structure by Cholesky decomposition.
Wt = A 1t StS
0
tA
 10
t
At is a k⇥ k lower triangular matrix with 1 on all diagonal elements. St is a k⇥ k
diagonal matrix.
At =
266664
1 0 · · · 0
a21,t 1
. . .
...
...
. . . . . . 0
ak1,t · · · ak,k 1,t 1
377775 , St =
266664
s1,t 0 · · · 0
0 s2,t
. . .
...
...
. . . . . . 0
0 · · · 0 sk,t
377775
si,t is the time-varying variance of i-th variable’s structural shock and aij,t is a time-
varying coefficient which represents the instantaneous effect from structural shock
of j-th variable to i-th variable. Define
Xt = Ik ⌦
⇣
1, y
0
t 1, y
0
t 2, · · · , y
0
t s
⌘
bt = [ct, B1,t, B2,t, · · · , Bs,t]
0
and rewrite the model in stacked form,
Yt = Xtbt + A 1t Stet
where et = (e1,t, e2,t, · · · ek,t)0 is the vector of normalized structural shocks. Given
et ⇠ N (0, Ik), we have A 1t Stet ⇠ N
⇣
0, A 1t St IkS
0
tA
 10
t
⌘
, so ut can be written as
ut = A 1t Stet. Define the lower triangular elements in At as a vector
at = (a21,t, a31,t, a32,t, · · · ak,k 1,t)0
and the diagonal elements in St as a vector
ht = (h1,t, h2,t · · · hk,t)0
where hi,t = log s2i,t. The parameters in TVP-SVVARmodel (bt, at, ht) are assumed
to follow random walk process,
bt+1 = bt + ub,t
at+1 = at + ua,t
ht+1 = ht + uh,t
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where ub,t ⇠ N(0,Sb), ua,t ⇠ N(0,Sa), uh,t ⇠ N(0,Sh) are also parameters for
estimation.
The estimation of TVP-SV VARmodel is based on Bayesian Theorem. The joint
posterior distribution’s kernel is given by P(bt, at, ht,Sb,Sa,Sh | Xt,Yt) µ P(Yt |
Xt, bt, at, ht,Sb,Sa,Sh)⇥ P(bt, at, ht,Sb,Sa,Sh)where P(Yt | Xt, bt, at, ht,Sb,Sa,Sh)
is likelihood function and P(bt, at, ht,Sb,Sa,Sh) is prior distribution. For the se-
lection of prior distribution and the algorithm of MCMC sampling, please refer to
Nakajima (2011).
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Estimation Results of 1999Q1-2016Q3 Sample
Prior Distribution Posterior Distribution
Parameters Mean St.Dev. Prior Mean St.Dev. 90% HPD Interval
jp 1.5 0.1 G 1.4679 0.1035 [1.2925, 1.6328]
jx 0.375 0.1 G 0.5839 0.1434 [0.3520, 0.8209]
js 0.8 0.1 B 0.8506 0.0281 [0.8050, 0.8959]
rp 0.8 0.1 B 0.4475 0.0906 [0.2967, 0.5921]
rx 0.8 0.1 B 0.7949 0.0658 [0.6906, 0.9022]
rs 0.8 0.1 B 0.5421 0.0843 [0.4001, 0.6784]
µp 0.5 0.5 IG 0.2424 0.0367 [0.1730, 0.2912]
µx 0.5 0.5 IG 0.2325 0.0432 [0.1749, 0.3130]
µs 0.5 0.5 IG 0.1364 0.0168 [0.1088, 0.1629]
Parameters Prior Distribution Mean St.Dev. 90% HPD Interval
k U(0, 1) 0.1058 0.0679 [0.0102, 0.2029]
l U(0, 2) 1.3958 0.3007 [0.9527, 1.9328]
Prior and Posterior Distribution of Structural Parameters
Prior and Posterior Distribution of Structural Parameters
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Multivariate Convergence Diagnostic
DSGE-VAR Impulse Response of Monetary Policy Shock
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DSGE-VAR Impulse Response of Supply Shock
DSGE-VAR Impulse Response of Demand Shock
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Appendix for Chapter 4
We show the de-trend, steady state and log-linearization of the medium-scale
DSGE model used in Chapter 4. Since the model has a long run growth trend, it is
necessary to de-trendmodel tomake it stationary. De-trending {Yt,Y⇤t ,Ct,Wt,Kt, It}
by dividing Zt leads to stationary variables {yt, y⇤t , ct,wt, kt, it}. Consumption
marginal utility Lt can be de-trend as lt = LtZ st
. De-trend equilibrium condi-
tions (4.1)-(4.16) and log-linearizing around steady state leads to the stationary
model. bXt ⇡ Xt XX means the deviation from its steady state. pt = Pt PP is the net
inflation rate.
We have 14 endogenous variables {blt, bct,bit, byt, by⇤t ,bkt, bwt, bLt,pt, bUt, bQt, bRKt , bRNt ,dMCt},
7 shock processes {#bt , #zt , #it, #gt , #wt , #pt , #rt}with 7 innovation terms {µbt , µzt , µit, µgt , µwt , µpt , µrt}.
The Log-linearized Model
bkt = 1  dz ⇣bkt 1   #zt⌘+ RKz bUt +
✓
1  1  d
z
◆bit✓
1  q
z
◆✓
1  bq
zs
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Appendix for Chapter 5
Steady State
I = dK, (1  bq)(C  qC) s = l, RL = R2S, bRS = P, m x = l
⇣
1  bP
⌘
,
l(q + jKd3) = µ[1   b(1   d)], 2bµ = l(2 + 3d2jK), jK = 2(1 b+bd qb)d2(3b 3 bd) , x =
bCBL
bL
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bL bHL
bL
, Y = C + I
 
1+ jK2 d
2  + G, MC = 11+e , w = (1  a)MCY+fL , q =
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Y
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1
1+e , Y = qK + wL,
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RL
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bHL
PRS
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The Log-linearized Model
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Appendix for Data
Data Source
Yield Curve of Japanese Government Bond Bloomberg
Call Rate Bank of Japan, Time-Series Data Search
Balance Sheet Variables Bank of Japan, Time-Series Data Search
S&P Japan Corporate Bond Index S&P
S&P Japan Government Bond Index S&P
Output Gap Bank of Japan, Research Data
Core-CPI and Core-CPI Inflation Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, Statistics Bureau
GDP Growth Rate Cabinet Office, System of National Accounts
Consumption Growth Rate Cabinet Office, System of National Accounts
Investment Growth Rate Cabinet Office, System of National Accounts
Wage Growth Rate Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, Labour Statistics
Bond Holding Structure for Calibration Ministry of Finance
Appendix for Program Code
Program code is available upon request.
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